Can the U.S. Deal With a Middle East Earthquake?

Over the last month the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has been jolted and fractured by the earthquake of the EU3+3 nuclear agreement with Iran and the numerous aftershocks that have followed. The players who are wedded to the status quo are struggling to navigate this new landscape. Western and regional diplomats have been jetting around the region in an effort to figure out how to deal with the changes. This turmoil within traditional alliances has come at an inconvenient time for the Obama administration as it struggles to implement its announced pivot or rebalancing to the Pacific. As National Security Advisor Susan Rice told the NY Times in October, “We can’t just be consumed 24/7 by one region, important as it is.”

Ever since Richard Nixon was forced to “pivot to the Pacific” by the Vietnam War, the U.S. has, at various times, relied on strong regional allies to protect its interests around the globe. Initially in the Middle East, the allies were Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the U.S. relied on Israel, Saudi Arabia and at times Egypt. Under George W. Bush this “twin pillars” strategy was abandoned for a policy of direct unilateral intervention to protect U.S. interests. Now, just when Obama would like to again rely on regional allies, the whole alliance structure is shifting and breaking down.

The Egyptian Revolution has taken Egypt completely out of the picture. Saudi Arabia’s divided and dysfunctional foreign policy team has been sorely tested by its desire to maintain relations with the U.S. while at the same time supporting sectarian conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Its vehement anti-Iran position and its leadership within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are being challenged by Iran’s diplomatic blitz. Iran was invited to the Manama Dialogue, a security conference in Bahrain, a Saudi client state. Ignoring Saudi objections, the GCC has responded positively to Iranian overtures to improve relations among Persian Gulf littoral states. GCC member Oman, a valuable U.S. intermediary with Iran, has rejected unequivocally a Saudi effort to unite the GCC as a single entity under Saudi leadership. Lebanon has rebuffed Saudi suggestions that the Lebanese Army turn its guns on Iran’s ally Hezbollah. The possibility of Iran dramatically increasing its oil production threatens the Saudi role as the swing producer in OPEC. Faced with the declining power of a key ally, the U.S. has relied on its default response of selling the Saudis billions of dollars of high tech weaponry.

America’s other pillar in the region, Israel, has its own struggles. The death of anti-apartheid hero, Nelson Mandala, came at a particularly bad time for Israel as it focused attention on Israel’s treatment of its non-Jewish population and resulted in growing international criticism Even the vaunted lobbying power of AIPAC is being called into question by its failure to prevent the Geneva Nuclear Agreement with Iran and, thus far, its inability to torpedo the Geneva agreement with new Congressional sanctions. As Obama’s threat to veto new Iran sanctions shows, Israel’s intransigence with respect to settlements seems to be wearing out its welcome at the White House. While the frustration with Israeli political pressure hasn’t reached the level of George Bush ’41 when his Secretary of State James Baker infamously said “F**k the Jews, they don’t vote for us anyway”, the frustration is certainly increasing. With a second term President, who isn’t facing an election, Israel has a problem.

While Saudi Arabia and Israel are discussing an alliance to counter Iranian influence, it appears to be a marriage of convenience. As the U.S. attempts to back away from direct commitments in Syria and Afghanistan, it will leave a power vacuum. It is not clear who will be able to fill this vacuum. Russia and China have ambitions in the region, but they have neither the will nor the way fill the U.S. role. As Beirut based Alistair Crooke said his recent post on Conflicts Forum, “Winding-down the US commitment in the region does not mean that all the area’s problems will be solved, but it does imply that the US will no longer be expected to resolve them all. “

Technorati Tags: AIPAC,Iran Nuclear Program,Middle East,Saydi Arabia,U.S. Foreign Policy

Obstacles to an Agreement with Iran

In order to understand the political dynamics surrounding the recently signed EU + 3/Iran nuclear agreement, it is important to understand some of the history. The U.S, sanctions regime against Iran began in 1979 shortly after the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. The initial sanctions were imposed by President Jimmy Carter who froze millions of dollars of Iranian assets in U.S. banks. In the 1980’s, the sanctions were expanded to include weapons and any financial aid to Iran, as the U.S. attempted to aid Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The sanctions regime was expanded in 1987 under President Ronald Reagan and again in 1997 under President Bill Clinton. President Obama has magnified the impact of the sanctions by threatening and coercing governments around the world, wishing to do business in the U.S., to abide by the unilateral American sanctions. These sanctions have had an increasingly negative impact on the Iranian economy and on the lives of ordinary Iranians. Circumventing and mitigating the effects of the sanctions has been a major focus of almost all Iranian governments.
The Iranian nuclear program dates back to 1957 when the U.S. signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s government under the Atoms for Peace Program. Following the revolution, the Siemens AG contract to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor was terminated. Shortly thereafter the Iranian government announced an ambitious program to construct its own reactor and to master the nuclear fuel cycle. In my opinion, while the nuclear program has been expanded to provide nuclear power and medical isotopes, its primary purpose has been to accumulate bargaining chips in order get the sanctions removed and reduced and to get Iran reintegrated into the international community. As the West has rebuffed all Iranian efforts at reintegration, the chips have continued to accumulate. It is not a nuclear weapon that concerns the U.S. and its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, but the reintegration of Iran into the global economy.
Iran is strategically located astride the Straits of Hormuz and is a buffer state between the Middle East and Central Asia. With its large (70mm), well-educated young population, relatively stable governance, and substantial potential for oil and gas production, Iran is much better positioned than its neighbors to project political and economic power, both within the region and globally. It is this potential to change the status quo in the region that most worries Iran’s adversaries. The nuclear weapons issue is a politically powerful red herring to cover the true concerns.
During the Geneva talks, Israel and Saudi Arabia spent much money, printers ink and bombast to prevent the interim agreement from being signed. Having failed in that effort, they are now rolling out the political big guns in Washington in order shoot down any final comprehensive deal that will result in rapprochement with Iran. Already the Obama administration is showing signs of backing away from any final status agreement. (See here and here.) While it is in America’s interest to resolve the conflict with Iran diplomatically, it is unclear to me whether or not Obama, who sees every foreign policy issue through a lens of domestic politics, will be able to summon the political will to deliver on the promise of the Geneva agreement.

Believe the Mullahs?

Ever since the EU3+3 and Iran announced their agreement on “Joint Plan of Action” with respect to Iran’s nuclear program and western sanctions on Iran, “the spin masters” on all sides have been busy framing the agreement in ways that match their political agendas. The U.S. media has given the most airtime and press space to those who are opposed to the agreement and who are determined to torpedo it. Most of the opponents have echoed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s pronouncement that the agreement is a “historic mistake”. Most of the pundits appear to have reached their conclusions without having read the document. Netanyahu certainly didn’t read the agreement as he made his statements days before the agreement was finalized. The Obama administration felt the need to fight back against their opponents by issuing a Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program. (As far as I can see they have neglected to publish the full text of the agreement) The Iranian government promptly rejected the Fact Sheet saying, “What has been released by the website of the White House as a fact sheet is a one-sided interpretation of the agreed text in Geneva and some of the explanations and words in the sheet contradict the text of the Joint Plan of Action…”. (See here) Iran promptly released the full text of the agreement. (See here) The Iranians also disputed Secretary of State John Kerry’s statement that “"We do not recognize a right to enrich".

With all this back and forth, I thought that it might be useful to actually look at the agreement. First, one should point out that this is an interim agreement designed to provide an opportunity to build trust between the parties and to deescalate the dispute while a final agreement is negotiated. That said the agreement does provide the “Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution.” None of the steps agreed upon for the interim period are irreversible for either side and nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.

With respect to the nuclear program, among other things, the agreement provides that Iran will:

• From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.

• Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

• Iran has decided to convert to oxide, UF6 (Uranium Hexafluoride) newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

With respect to the right to enrich, the agreement states, “This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program.” This sounds to me like recognition of the right to enrich with IAEA inspection.

With respect to sanctions the agreement says, “This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.” The U.S. piece was weasel worded in recognition of Congress’s ability to throw a monkey wrench in the agreement. Iran’s agreement on the Additional Protocol of the NPT was also weasel worded in recognition of the Iranian Parliament’s ability to refuse to ratify it as they refused to do in 2003.

Despite all the controversy, the Geneva Agreement appears to me to be a balanced effort which achieves its goal of buying time for a reasonable and comprehensive solution to the 35 year war between the U.S. and Iran. It is too bad, however, that in order to get the facts, one must rely on the mullahs rather than the U.S. Dept. of State. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani seems to treat his people like adults and explain exactly what he agreed to and what he didn’t. It would be nice if the U.S. government would do the same for us.

Photo by LA Times

Technorati Tags: Iran Nuclear Program,Iran,Geneva Agreement

Close But No Cigar

Last week, after three days of intense negotiations between the EU3+3 and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the participants announced that they had failed to reach an agreement and departed Geneva saying that negotiations would reconvene on November 20 at a lower level. Throughout the negotiation process there had been much optimism and speculation that an agreement was possible. Speculation reached a fever pitch when senior diplomats from most of the participating countries flew to Geneva in order to join in the negotiations. (This is usually a sign that a photo op is imminent.) While exact reason for the collapse of the negotiating process is unclear as of this writing, it appears that we have shifted from a negotiating mode to a blame game mode.

Most of the day on Saturday was spent, not on negotiations with the Iranians, but on negotiations within the EU3+3, trying to iron out their internal disagreements. Contemporaneous reports and leaks by diplomats and reporters on the scene in Geneva stated that France was responsible for the lack of agreement. France was insisting that the interim agreement be rewritten in order to include a Iranian commitment to stop construction of the Arak heavy water reactor. The reason for taking this position is mystifying. While a heavy water reactor is a proliferation concern, as it produces weapons grade plutonium, the Arak facility is over a year away from being completed and another year away from making enough plutonium to produce a weapon. The proposed agreement is a six month reversible interim agreement. This week Secretary of State Kerry, concerned that France was being blamed, announced that Iran was to blame for the failure when it backed away from language concerning their right to enrichment. It sounds to me like revisionist diplomacy and amateur hour at the State Department.

In order to understand why assessing blame is politically important, it is helpful to look at the history. In 2004, under President Khatami, Iran offered to cap its centrifuges at 3000 and it had very little low enriched uranium. This offer was rejected by the U.S. By 2009 Iran had over 7000 centrifuges and 1000 kg of low enriched uranium. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad agreed to ship the low enriched uranium out of the country and have it reprocessed into fuel for the Tehran medical reactor. However, faced with political turmoil following the disputed election, Iran reneged. This deal was revived by Turkey and Brazil in 2010 and this time it was rejected by the U.S. Today Iran has almost 20,000 centrifuges and more than 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium and hundreds of kg of 20% enriched uranium. During this period, the U.S. has implemented a series of draconian economic sanctions on Iran and bullied other countries into going along. The sanctions have dramatically affected the lives of ordinary Iranians and have had no effect on Iran’s nuclear program.

If the U.S. and its allies are seen as not serious about a diplomatic solution, the countries that are cooperating on sanctions may begin to take a different stance. This is especially true if Congress continues to take a “war hawk” position and doubles down on sanctions. If the sanctions regime falls apart, the U.S. has no viable option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program other than military action. The current round of diplomacy is possibly the last, best chance for a diplomatic solution. Unfortunately, Ambassador John Limbert’s fifth rule of U.S. – Iranian relations is still in effect. “Whenever you seem to be making progress, someone or some diabolical coincidence will mess it up”.

(Photo by Yahoo! News)

Technorati Tags: Iran,Iran Nuclear Program,John Kerry

America East of Suez

Last week President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, unveiled, what the media is calling “a more modest strategy for the Mideast”. (See here) Ms. Rice said that the administration would focus its efforts on negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran, brokering a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and mitigating the strife in Syria. The strategy also acknowledged that there are limits to what the U.S. can accomplish in nurturing democracy in the region. While I might argue with some of the specifics, the new strategy appears to be an effort to rectify some of the problems that have plagued U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades.

As U.S. involvement in the Middle East has deepened since the end of WW II, U.S. efforts to project power in the region have clashed with the desire of Middle Easterners for self-determination and political independence. The U.S. has also failed to identify its vital national interests and to focus its policies and power on addressing those interests. This lack of focus has led to policies and objectives that are not only conflicting, but in many cases mutually exclusive. These policy disconnects have led to a failure to accomplish foreign policy objectives. Those it has accomplished have been more in spite of rather than because of the policies.

My definition of a “vital national interest” is one that deals with an existential threat to the U.S. and one for which the U.S. is willing to spill its blood and to spend its treasure in order to accomplish its objectives. By this definition, the U.S. has no vital national interest in events in the Middle East. Since WW II access to the energy resources of the Middle East at a reasonable price has been a vital national interest. With the advent of “fracking” and shale, the U.S. is on the verge of becoming a net energy exporter and this has fundamentally changed energy geopolitics. U.S. interests are now more associated with non-proliferation of WMD and controlling and defeating the Sunni jihadist threat. While U.S. blind support for Israel will remain a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it attempts to deal with Middle Easterners, the larger Israel/Palestinian conflict, with the death of the two state solution, has morphed into an internal Israeli problem. The Israelis themselves will have to decide what kind of a country they want to be.

The Obama administration seems to have realized that, in order to successfully deal with the jihadist and WMD issues, they will need to deal with Iran. Iranian cooperation is crucial for the attainment of U.S. policy objectives. Success in dealing with Iran will require taking into account Iran’s requirement for sovereignty over its energy policy and autonomy in designing and implementing its foreign policy. Saudi Arabia has become marginalized on the energy issue and on the jihadist issue. It is part of the problem and not part of the solution. Saudi realization that the U.S. may be looking after its own national interest rather than following the lead of the most undemocratic regimes in the region has led to what only can be described as a “temper tantrum”. Turning down a seat on the UN Security Council (See here) to send a message to the U.S. may be the ultimate tantrum.

The U.S. may be experiencing its own “East of Suez” moment as it accepts that it has diminished influence in the global arena. (See here) This transition will be difficult for Americans to accept, particularly the empire-building neo-cons, but at the end of the day both America and the Middle East may be better for it.

 

Technorati Tags: Iran,U.S. Foreign Policy,Iran Nuclear Program,Middle East

This Week in Iran

This week’s opening of the U.N. General Assembly was not its normal boring gabfest, but a fascinating and fast moving diplomatic event. The presence of newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who arrived with a clear agenda to move the ball forward in normalizing Iranian relations with the West, made for fascinating diplomatic drama which culminated in President Obama’s phone conversation with Rouhani.

Not only were Rouhani’s diplomatic and political skills on display, but they were accompanied by a sophisticated, adept and agile Iranian public relations campaign. (Who’d have thunk it?) The blizzard of tweets, press releases and op-ed pieces orchestrated by the Iranians was amazing to watch. Gary Sick, an Iran expert with Columbia University commented, “They’re putting stuff out faster than the naysayers can keep up. They dominate the airwaves”. Even the vaunted Israeli “hasbara” public relations machine has been caught flat footed. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has come off sounding like a grumpy old warmonger. The neo-con, and normally bellicose pundits, such as Bill Kristol, John Bolton and Charles Krauthammer have struggled to find their voice.

Even the main stream media has struggled with how to react. The most egregious example came from NBC’s Brian Williams who stated, “This is all part of a new leadership effort by Iran - suddenly claiming they don't want nuclear weapons; what they want is talks and transparency and good will. And while that would be enough to define a whole new era, skepticism is high and there's a good reason for it." This statement that this is “sudden” is patently untrue. What is seen as sudden by Williams has been the Iranian position for over a decade. When President Khatami proposed a “grand bargain” in 2003, he faced the George W. Bush administration who, as Ambassador Ryan Crocker told me, “didn’t think that it was real”. When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed something similar, Obama was faced with an Iranian President whose bellicose rhetoric on Israel and the Holocaust were too politically toxic to deal with.

Now, however, we have the happy convergence of leaders whose default position is diplomacy, increasingly shared interests and a rapidly changing political environment in the Middle East. The two predominant naysayers, Israel and Saudi Arabia, have about worn out their welcome with Obama. Israel by torpedoing every effort to resolve the Palestinian situation and Saudi Arabia by underwriting al Qaeda affiliated groups throughout the region.

The Western media has portrayed Iranian ability to make the necessary concessions as the biggest obstacle. In fact, the ability of the U.S. to deal with sanctions relief is a much bigger obstacle. Iran is not going to agree to any deal that does not, at least in some measure, provide for sanctions relief. The Iran sanctions are written into U. S, law. While the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 gives the President some limited waiver authority, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 has no such provision. Given the fact that Congressional Republicans are in no mood to give Obama a political and diplomatic victory and the spectacle of zero concern for the country’s best interests that we are now witnessing, any action is unlikely. We may, once again, miss a golden opportunity to resolve this problem peacefully. The first rule of U.S./Iranian relations, “Never walk through an open door. Instead beat your head against the wall” still applies.

Technorati Tags: Barack Obama,Iran,Iran Nuclear Program

The Landscape Changes Again

The rise of the Arab Awakening which began with so much promise and its subsequent decent into chaos has drastically changed the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and North Africa. Libya and Tunisia are mired in political turmoil. Egypt is tittering on the brink of civil conflict. Syria is deeply engaged in a full scale civil war with no end in sight. Yemen’s civil unrest is not yet a civil war, but with its separationist history, civil conflict is certainly possible. Iraq is experiencing as much sectarian violence as during the dark days of the “surge”. Lebanon is threatened by collapse as outside forces play out their geopolitical goals. Only Hezbollah’s balancing efforts and refusal to play the sectarian card, are keeping Lebanon stable. Jordan is trying desperately to avoid spillover from its unstable neighbors.

In all these countries that experienced transition from decades long authoritarian rule to some form of democracy, neither the leaders nor the international community realized that the people didn’t necessarily want democracy. What they wanted was a better life and to be treated better by their government. None of the leaders that succeeded the authoritarian rules, whether they were Islamist or secular, had any vision about how to move their countries ahead.

The result of all this is that the region has become a playground for jihadists who hold an al Qaeda like worldview. Trained in Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi tradition, they have arrived from around the world, including Europe and the U.S., in order to fight for their vision of an Islamic caliphate. While the bulk of the Arab world does not want to be ruled by jihadists and other hardline Islamists, the hardliners are slowly gaining the upper hand. Their success in the region as well as the threat that they pose when they bring their worldview and fighting skills back to their countries of origin, makes these Sunni jihadists the biggest national security threat to the U.S. and other western countries.

This threat has drastically changed the geopolitical calculus in the region. The biggest threat to Israel is no longer attack by its Arab neighbors, who have bigger problems of their own and have largely lost interest in the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue is now an internal Israeli problem. Having established their rule over all of historical Palestine, they now have the problem of how to deal with a minority population ruling over the majority, in many cases brutally. History has shown that this is not a recipe for stability.

As the Sunni jihadists have become the major security threat, Saudi Arabia’s support and funding of these characters has made Saudi Arabia part of the problem and not part of the solution. Can the U.S. maintain its close relationship with Saudi Arabia while trying to deal with the mounting jihadist treat?

The Sunni jihadist threat also has implications for U.S. and western relations with Iran. Iran, a predominately Shia country, has the same concerns about the Sunni jihadists as do the western countries. This makes Iran a natural ally in combating this threat. Combine this fact with the charm offensive initiated by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and we may have an opening for rapprochement between Iran and the west. Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be happy, but occasionally western countries have acted in their own national interest. Openings have been there before and have been rebuffed. This time may be different.

Technorati Tags: Iran,Middle East

Iran’s Election is a Contest

 

Most western pundits portray Iranian elections as a sham orchestrated by the Supreme leader to reach a desired outcome. (See here and here) I, however, find the rough and tumble political contests among Iran’s many factions to be fascinating. Tomorrow’s first round of the Iranian Presidential election is shaping up to be an interesting race; perhaps more interesting than the usual U.S. election which generally boils down to two candidates, selected by the big money donors, who are undifferentiated with respect to their foreign policy.

The most recent polling data that I have seen shows the following:

Prediction of voter turnout:                     71%.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf                  23%

Mohsen Rezaei                                         14%

Hassan Rowhani                                       13%

Saeed Jalili                                                10%

Ali Akbar Velayati                                       8%

Mohammad Reza Aref                               6%

Mohammad Gharazi                                  2%

Gholam Ali Haddad Adel                            2%

Hassan Rowhani, the only cleric in the group, and Mohammad Aref represent the more moderate wing of Iranian politics. Since this polling, Aref has dropped out of the contest in order avoid splitting the “moderate vote”. This change, combined with the endorsement of Rowhani by former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani seems to have given the secular liberal population a new dose of enthusiasm. With the remaining candidates splitting the “conservative” vote, it is plausible that Mohammad Ghalibaf and Rowhani could end up in the June 21 runoff election.

Ghalibaf, the pragmatic Mayor of Tehran, is a strong and popular candidate. For a large metropolitan area Tehran is a livable city, if you can get by the life threatening experience of Tehran traffic. Tehranis tend to love their mayors. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a former Tehran mayor. While the projected turnout may be overstated, it is certain to be greater than the U.S. 58%.

Whatever the outcome, any change in Iran’s foreign policy is unlikely. A large majority of Iranians support the nuclear program and changing position on this is in the hands of the Supreme Leader and politically is a non-starter. If the outcome results in better management of the Iranian economy it will make a difference for the ordinary Iranian and that’s what counts for them.

(Another commentary on Iran’s election is here)

Technorati Tags: Iran Election

After the Election:What Now?

After months of campaign wrangling, the presidential election is now behind us and we are left with the question: What will US Middle East policy look like going forward? Since the election campaign was largely devoid of any discussion or debate on policy options, pundits are left to speculate based on a combination of hope, realities and educated guesses. Some things are clear. The major winner from the election outcome was Nate Silver, the NY Times statistics blogger, (See here) who got the results exactly right. (Close, but never in doubt.) The major loser was Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who bet big time on the wrong horse. On everything else we can only speculate and wait and see what will happen. In general, not much is likely to change.

The Syrian civil war drags on with the death toll on all sides rising with each passing day. Obama has little choice but to support the rebels rhetorically and with some modest aid, while relying on the wealthy Gulf States to do the heavy lifting of arming the rebels. There is no mood in the US to get entangled in another Middle East ground conflict. Iran and its allies will continue to support the Assad regime. Any negotiated settlement would require engagement with Iran. This would acknowledge Iran’s role as a regional player and is an anathema to Washington’s foreign policy wizards. The biggest losers will be the Syrian people.

The so called “Arab Awakening” will likely continue on its own path with the US having little influence on the outcomes. The road to functioning democracies in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya will be bumpy with an ending that is not likely to be friendly to US ambitions for regional control. There is not much that the US can do to influence the ending except to continue to support them and hope for the best. Hopefully, Congress will not mess it up.

As the “Arab Awakening” spreads to authoritarian US allies in the Gulf region and Jordan, the US will face some uncomfortable choices. With US bases in place and the US requiring Arab support for its anti-Iran policies, the policy has been to offer soft encouragement for reform, but no direct regime criticism. As the regimes crack down more aggressively on dissidents, (See here and here) this policy may become more untenable. Again, I expect that the US will continue current policies and hope for the best.

In Israel/Palestine, Prime Minister Netanyahu has lost all credibility with the Obama administration. His antics have left him on the outside looking in. However, I believe that Obama has realized that a “two state solution” is no longer possible. Given Israeli intransigence and control of Congress, and Palestinian divisions, there is not much that he can do to change the situation. Again, he will continue to be disengaged and hope for the best.

Iran probably offers the best opportunity for improvement. The Iranians have signaled their willingness to compromise by softening their rhetoric, transferring some of their 20% enriched uranium to civilian uses and offering to suspend enrichment to higher levels. (See here) If the US responds in-kind, the upcoming talks may bear some fruit. The Iranians, however, will not move without some reduction in sanctions. Given that Congress controls the sanctions regime, Obama will have little ability to negotiate in good faith on sanctions. Promising to consider reducing sanctions at some time in the future will not cut it.

All of this ignoring the problems and hoping for the best, reminds me of the Bill Clinton administration when President Clinton told a State Department official that he was not particularly interested in foreign policy issues because none of his voters were interested. The response was “Sometimes, Mr. President, foreign policy issues find you.” Usually at the most inopportune time.

 

Technorati Tags: Middle East,Election,Obama

Iran Policy: Morally and Effectively Bankrupt

During the campaign debates between the major party presidential candidates, the two candidates essentially agreed on almost every subject. Romney claimed that Obama’s policies had failed and then announced that he would follow the same failed policies. On Iran the only disagreement was who would be the tougher president. Under Obama, the U.S. has engaged in economic warfare by imposing a unilateral sanctions regime and has strong armed other countries into abiding by the sanctions. The resulting economic dislocation, aggravated by mismanagement by the Iranian government, has had a significant impact on the economy. Oil exports have plummeted, contributing to a precipitous decline in the value of the rial. This decline, along with financial restrictions on marine insurance and funds transfer , have contributed to rising inflation and have made it difficult to import even essential goods such as medical equipment and drugs.

Despite all of the political noise, there has been almost no discussion about whether or not the sanctions policy is being effective in achieving its objectives and no discussion about the morality of economic warfare on the Iranian people.

Following the First Gulf War, the U.S. and its allies imposed draconian sanctions on Iraq designed to “punish the Iraqi people”. These sanctions destroyed the Iraqi healthcare and educational systems and resulted in hundreds of thousands of unnecessary Iraqi deaths. (See here) Madeleine Albright (then US UN ambassador) declared on 60 Minutes that “the price is worth it”. In 1998 Denis Halliday, the UN administrator of the oil-for-food program, resigned to protest the sanctions saying, “We are in the process of destroying an entire country” and calling them “nothing less than genocide’. His replacement, Hans von Sponeck, resigned in 2000 denouncing the sanctions as “criminal policy”. (See here) As we head down the same path in Iran, the same descriptions apply.

The stated objectives behind the sanctions on Iran have been variously stated to be: to force Iran to abandon or change its nuclear program or to provoke civil unrest resulting in the overthrow of the Iranian government. The decade long enhanced sanctions regime has accomplished neither of these objectives. In the past decade, Iran has gone from a small number of centrifuges creating a small amount of low enriched uranium to thousands of centrifuges creating a large amount of 20% enriched uranium. The regime has withstood the large demonstrations surrounding the 2009 elections.

While accurate polling in Iran by western pollsters is difficult, it is not impossible. Recent polls show that there is little appetite for regime change. 85% of Iranians say it is important for Iran to have a civilian nuclear program. 65% blamed the worsening economy on western sanctions and only 11% on government mismanagement. 76% have an unfavorable view of the US. These and other results (See here) show that the theory that, if pressured enough, Iranians will rise against their government is wrong. Secondly, the more Iranians suffer, the more they blame those imposing the sanctions and not their own government.

It is time for our political leaders, whoever they may be, to rethink the Iran policy on which they so much agree.

Technorati Tags: Iran,Iran Sanctions

Soft Power Wins for Iran

Critics of the George W. Bush administration have frequently cited his reliance on “hard power”, particularly military force, to achieve US foreign policy objectives as a major cause of declining US popularity and effectiveness around the world. Although she generally agreed with Bush administration policies, particularly in the Middle East, Hilary Clinton attempted to differentiate herself from the Bush administration policies and Barak Obama’s emphasis on “soft power” during the run up to the 2008 election by coining the phrase “smart power”.
As we have discovered by observing Secretary of State Clinton in action, her definition of “smart power’ is significantly different from “soft power”. For her, “smart power” is an attempt to put a softer face on “hard power”. As she is discovering, it is very hard to put a soft face on drone attacks, “crippling sanctions” and ongoing occupations.
“Soft Power”, on the other hand, consists of persuading others to what you want because they see convergence between your interests and their interests and they understand your respect for their interests and appreciate your assistance in achieving them. We can better see the effective use of “soft power” by observing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to Lebanon.
During the visit Ahmadinejad met with Christian President Suleiman, Sunni Prime Minister Hariri as well as Shia leaders of Hezbollah. He toured the country in an open vehicle welcomed by adoring crowds. (Try to duplicate that Barack Obama.)
Western media and leaders have tried to portray the visit as “provocation” and an attempt to subvert the “pro-western” government of Saud Hariri. Former British Intelligence officer and Director of the Beirut based Conflicts Forum paints a different picture in a recent post.
“Iran’s popularity on the streets should not surprise anyone.  It is real, and it is heartfelt – and extends beyond the Shi’i of the south of Beirut.  Having been present here in Beirut throughout the war of 2006, I experienced the almost universal shock at how leaders and so-called ‘friends of Lebanon’ such as Tony Blair and Condoleezza Rice tried to fend-off and delay a ceasefire – in order to allow Israel more time to ‘finish the job’, i.e. to destroy more bridges, more infrastructure and impose civilian casualties – as our ‘price’ to be paid for Hizbullah’s seizure of Israeli soldiers. Feelings here are still raw on this point, and all sectors of opinion know that the only real support for Lebanon in those dark hours came from Syria and Iran.  Unsurprisingly, there was a direct element of gratitude in expression to Iran in recent days both for the support then, and its subsequent economic assistance to repair the damage.” (The complete post is here.)
The clear winners in the Iraq war have been Iran and the larger Shia community. By finding common interests with potential allies and working with these allies to achieve their common interests, Iran has effectively exploited this victory and increased its regional influence. The hard liners in Tehran have also been able to exploit US lead sanctions, which are making life difficult for ordinary Iranians, to improve their internal position. Soft power works.

Blow up in Iran

On Sunday a coordinated suicide bombing in the restive Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan killed 42 people including several senior Revolutionary Guard commanders. The radical Sunni opposition group Jundallah (Army of God) claimed responsibility. Iranian authorities have accused Pakistan, Britain and the US of being complicit in the attack; a charge that the US has vehemently denied. This denial, however, is suspect.
Last year New Yorker magazine’s senior national security correspondent Seymour Hersh wrote an article in which he detailed the Bush administration’ s $400mm covert operations program in Iran. (The entire article is here) The program functions by providing funding, weapons and training to Iranian opposition groups such as Jundallah, MEK and PJAK in an effort to undermine the regime in the Islamic Republic. Hersh describes the US relationship with Jundallah in these words:
“The Administration may have been willing to rely on dissident organizations in Iran even when there was reason to believe that the groups had operated against American interests in the past. The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. “The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda,” Baer told me. “These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it’s Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we’re once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties.” Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists.
One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People’s Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. “This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists,” Nasr told me. “They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture.” The Jundallah took responsibility for the bombing of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February, 2007. At least eleven Guard members were killed. According to Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.”
These types of highly classified covert programs take a long time to unwind and have a long tail that even their CIA program officers can’t control. They also can be the spark that ignites a conflagration. We can only hope that this is not one of those.

What now for Iran?

The events of the last couple of weeks in Iran, in which millions of courageous Iranians from all walks of life have taken to the streets in the face violent repression to protest a stolen election, have produced riveting real time theater around the world. These events have also drastically changed the political landscape not only in Iran, but also in the US and in the Middle East. As the Iranian conflict moves from the streets to the back rooms of the Iranian political elite, political leaders of all stripes will need to figure out how to navigate this changed landscape.

In the space of two weeks the Islamic Republic has changed from what Mohsen Milani calls “a stable institutionalized system of governance with both authoritarian and democratic features, with domestic constituencies …” (What I call a pseudo-democracy.) to a brutal, repressive military dictatorship. As the street protests fade, the Iranian political elite, hardliners, moderates and reformists, are working behind the scenes to understand how to deal with this new reality. It will take time for their decisions to emerge.

In the US, the searing images of young Iranian women in headscarves facing down riot police and being shot down for their efforts will take a long time to fade from the American consciousness. No longer will the American vision of Iranians be that of radical fanatics and quiescent, repressed, powerless women. They will be able to get by these stereotypes and see them as people like themselves, struggling to make a better life for themselves and their families. Their perspective on American Iranian policy will certainly be different.

In the larger Middle East, groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria who have counted on support from the Iranian regime may begin to question the stability of this support base. Whatever the face of the Iranian regime that emerges from the current conflict, it will be different from that of the past. A reformist or moderate government will be more open to engagement with the west. A hard-line regime will be distracted by the complex question of how to deal with a majority of the population, including almost all of the educated elite who are the backbone of the economy, who do not support them. Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria may find it expedient to hedge their bets and improve their relations with the west.

Faced with this changing landscape US policy makers will be faced with difficult short and medium term policy choices. In the short term, the Obama administration, in my opinion, should maintain its low profile and allow the Iranian people to sort this out. In the medium term, a policy of public, full engagement seems to be the best choice. We can only deal with the government we have, not the government we wish we had. With a hard-line regime, engagement is not likely to bring about much immediate change, but the internal and external pressure will be on the Iranian regime.

As Dr. Martin Luther King said in 1965 on the steps of the Alabama state capital:

"I know you are asking today, "How long will it take?"....
"I come to say to you this afternoon, however difficult the moment, however frustrating the hour, it will not be long, because truth crushed to earth will rise again.”
"How long? Not long, because no lie can live forever.”
"How long? Not long, because you shall reap what you sow....”
"How long? Not long, because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."

The Iranian Conundrum

Most of the ink being spilled this week regarding the Middle East situation involved the disagreements between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minster Netanyahu regarding ongoing construction of Jewish colonies in the occupied West Bank. Obama’s policy was clearly defined by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton when she said “He wants to see a stop to settlements — not some settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.” Netanyahu responded by saying that construction would continue in existing settlements.
Little is being said about Iran. Netanyahu came to Washington with a plan to divert attention from Israel/Palestine to the Iranian threat. Obama demurred and indicated that he would continue on a path of dialogue and diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic. He said that he felt that progress on the Israeli/Palestinian front would help with progress on the Iranian front.
The problem is what Obama expects as an outcome from the dialogue and engagement. It appears that his goal is a continuation of the Bush administration policy of using “crippling sanctions” to force Iran to abandon its nuclear development program. Hilary Clinton has made it clear on several occasions that the purpose of negotiations is to help rally a coalition to impose tougher sanctions on Iran. Special Envoy on Iran Dennis Ross is quoted in an upcoming book by David Makovsky, a fellow at the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as saying that the United States will not make progress towards peace in the Middle East with the Obama administration’s new plan. The idea that there was linkage between the Israel/Palestine issue and the Iranian issue was a myth. (If he doesn’t agree with the plan can he be effective in implementing it?) All this begs the question “Are ‘crippling sanctions’ even possible?”
While reformist Iranian presidential candidates have indicated openness to negotiations, even the moderates defend Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They are willing to talk about how to insure that there isn’t a nuclear weapons program. This is an opening for constructive dialogue on how to reconcile the national interests of all parties. In my experience, anything beyond this is a political non-starter for Iranian politicians. Most average people on the street in Iran told me that they support Iran’s effort to develop peaceful nuclear energy.
This policy of isolation of Iran has failed before under Bill Clinton and Bush 43 and it is doomed to fail again. Unfortunately the failure on the Iranian front will have negative consequences for the Israel/Palestine process which only now is beginning to show some promise.

Choices in Afghanistan

As the Obama administration conducted its promised reassessment of the situation in Afghanistan, it faced three basic options for moving forward to deal with this intractable problem. The overall US strategic interest, as Obama has indicated on several occasions, is to prevent organizations with global reach, such as al Qaeda, from using Afghanistan as a base from which to attack US interests around the world.
One option is to scale back ambitions and restrict activities to those that would insure that Afghanistan is not used as an al Qaeda sanctuary. A second option is to mount a large scale counter insurgency effort utilizing large numbers of US/NATO troops to defeat the Taliban, create a large economic development effort and install a friendly government. The third option is to boost US commitment to train Afghan police and security forces to allow them to assume the primary role in the conflict.
Each of these options has risks, advantages and problems. In today’s announcement regarding the way forward in Afghanistan, the Obama administration appears to have signed up for the third option.
The first option would have required admitting defeat and conducting a long term campaign of military attacks and covert actions which would undermine and destabilize the Afghan government. It appears that this endless conflict was not palatable politically.
The second option would have required a large commitment of US/NATO combat forces for a long period of time. The administration would have faced escalating US casualties. Also, providing logistical support to a large combat force would also have been a daunting task. The Taliban has shown an increasing capability to interdict the current supply route through Pakistan and the Khyber Pass. The present alternate overland route through Russia and Central Asia is difficult and limited to “non-lethal” material. The best alternative for a massive logistical effort utilizes the Iranian port of Chabaher on the Gulf of Oman and the existing Indian/Iranian constructed highway into Afghanistan. For this overt cooperation with the US, Iran surely would have extracted major concessions on other issues that would have been politically difficult for the US.
The third option, while eliminating the downsides of the other two, has its own issues. Standing up the Afghan security forces will be difficult, time consuming and expensive. While many of the insurgents and their supporters, both within and outside of the security forces, are not ideological supporters of the Taliban, they do fear Taliban retribution and support them for economic reasons (They pay better.). Countering this will require establishing security, destroying the drug trade (the major source of Taliban funding), eliminating Taliban bases in Pakistan and co-opting low and middle level Taliban. Ongoing attacks inside Pakistan to eliminate bases, with the resulting civilian casualties, run the risk of destabilizing nuclear armed Pakistan.
What ever the option, the road out of this mess will be long and hard.

Engaging Iran II

During her recent diplomatic tour of Europe and the Middle East, Secretary of State Clinton indicated that Iran would be invited to the upcoming security conference on Afghanistan. This is a positive development as both the US and Iran would like to see a stable Afghanistan which is not governed by the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban and the US and Iran can probably reach some accommodation on dealing with Afghanistan.
Other issues between the US and Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hezbollah will, however, be much more difficult to deal with. When I returned from Iran two years ago people asked me “What do you think about Iran’s nuclear ambitions?” My answer was “I have no idea whether or not Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, but I can understand why they might want them”.
Iran is surrounded by Sunni ruled countries who have been encouraged by the US to be hostile toward Iran and the so-called “Shia crescent”. Iran’s two major adversaries, US and Israel, are nuclear armed and have threatened regime change and a military attack on the Islamic Republic.
Up until now Iran’s strategic defense strategy has been asymmetric. Rather than relying on their conventional forces, Iran has armed and aided Hamas and Hezbollah in order to threaten Israel should either the US or Israel attack. It has also encouraged and supported Muslim Brotherhood related Islamist opposition groups in Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan who are allied with the US. A nuclear capability would give Iran a deterrent defense capability that did not rely on Hezbollah and Hamas or political unrest in the Arab world.
If the US is to be able to convince Iran to change its strategic calculations, there will need to be a major change in American policies toward Iran. Iran will need to be persuaded that the US no longer desires regime change and has taken the military option off the table. They will also expect that the US will demonstrate that it is able to control Israel. (This is a difficult task given likelihood of an Israeli government led by Bibi Netanyahu.)
In view of the large population of neo-liberals and AIPAC supporters of Likud’s hard-line Israeli policies within the Obama administration, it is unlikely that such a major policy shift can occur. So far the US talk has continued to be about “carrots and sticks” to which the Iranian response has been “carrots and sticks are for donkeys”. We will, therefore, likely see a continuation of the adversarial stalemate brought about by the policies of the last 30 years with its adverse implications for stability in the region.

Where is Dennis Ross?

The Obama administration seems to be approaching many of the world’s trouble spots utilizing special envoys to engage these regions. His appointment of Senator George Mitchell as envoy to deal with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was well received by Israel’s neighbors in the region and by informed observers around the world.
He next appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as envoy tasked with dealing with India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Because Holbrooke has little experience in this region and thus brings no baggage and preconceived notions to his position, his bulldozer style of diplomacy may be well suited to helping to resolve some of the long festering issues between these parties.
Since, during the campaign, Obama made a major issue of changing the dynamic of US – Iranian relations, most observers had expected that he would promptly appoint a special envoy to Iran. The administration, early on, floated the name of former Clinton administration Middle East advisor Dennis Ross. This idea was not well received in Iran. An Iranian government spokesman described him as a “Zionist lobbyist”. They are right on this count. Ross’s role in the Clinton era Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has been described as “Israel’s lawyer”.
Since Ross’s name was floated, nothing has been heard. Observers, myself included, have wondered what is going on. It is possible that the Obama administration is taking the Iranian reaction into consideration.
It is also possible that, after the issues he has experienced with nominees “forgetting” to pay their taxes, Obama wants to avoid another vetting problem. Ross’s vetting problem stems from his failure to register as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. (FARA) Ross is Chairman of the Jerusalem based and Israeli government funded Jewish People Policy Planning Institute. (JPPPI) The Department of Justice has long said recipients of this type of funding must register under FARA. (The whole story is here.)
Hopefully this problem will keep Mr. Ross on the sidelines. Improved US-Iranian relations have the potential to change the dynamics of many of the intractable conflicts in the region. Hopefully, we will end up with an envoy who will bring an open minded and even handed approach to the position.

Balloon Festival

Impatience on the part of commentators to put the Bush administration and its policies behind us and to get on with “change you can believe in” has led them to bemoan the long transition period between elections in early November and inauguration in late January. They have pointed out that the extended power vacuum with a lame duck President and an incoming President Elect with no power but promising changed policies is dangerous. This, they say, is particularly true in a time of global conflict and economic crisis.

The transition period is, however, an opportunity, not only to assemble the new team, but also to float policy trial balloons in order to ascertain public and government reaction. The Obama team has made good use of the transition period for this purpose. They have floated trial policy options on healthcare, climate change and the economic crisis.

This week they have launched balloons with respect to the Middle East. Obama discussed an Iran policy that included economic carrots and potential increases in sanctions. This balloon was greeted in the region with yawns and comments of “so what’s new”.

A more interesting balloon was the suggestion that the US might negotiate a formal nuclear umbrella agreement with Israel to provide deterrence against a nuclear attack on Israel. This was first mentioned by Hilary Clinton during the primary race, but in the context of a threat to “obliterate Iran”.

The idea was greeted in Israel with uniform opposition. Their rational was that this would indicate that the US accepts a nuclear armed Iran and it would not give Israel complete control over their nuclear response options. They could, however, have another problem with this suggestion. It may indicate that the US might sign on to the concept of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

The potential usefulness of this concept can be seen in the negotiations that are currently going on in the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (OPCW) The OPCW is the only arena where the US is currently engaged in direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
One of the objections that Iran has expressed to eliminating chemical weapons is that the “chemical and nuclear weapons” of the “Zionist regime” is the “most dangerous threat to regional and international peace.” Egypt and Syria, who along with Israel are not signatories to the current Chemical Weapons Convention, have said that they cannot join until the Middle East is free of WMD.

Iran has, in the past, indicated that they are open to any US proposal for a WMD free Middle East. This scares the h___ out if Israel. Former Israeli MK Ephraim Sneh told me “no way, no way” would Israel agree to this.

Trail balloons are generally hot air balloons and float with the political winds. We will have to wait and see which way the wind blows this one.

Disappearing from the pages of history

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has been regularly castigated for saying that “Israel will be wiped off the face of the map”. A better translation from the Farsi of what he said is “The Zionist regime in Jerusalem will disappear from the pages of history”.
His point was that a country that is based on religion cannot long survive. He seems to have missed the irony that he is the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He may, however, have a point.
It may not be a large problem in Iran which is 99% Shia Muslim, but Israel’s population, on the other hand, is 20% Arab, Christians and Muslims.
During my trips to the region, I have seen a growing sense of anger and frustration among the Israeli Arab population. This anger and frustration stems not only from the treatment of their Arab brothers and sisters in the West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation, but also from the discrimination that they experience within Israel in housing, education and jobs. They are, in effect, second class citizens in their own country.
After years of festering just under the surface, the frustration boiled to the surface in the last week in the Israeli northern port city of Acre. Acre is a gritty lower middle class city of mixed Jews and Arabs who live together, sometimes in separate communities and sometimes next to each other.
On the eve of the Jewish holy day, Yom Kippur, during which many observant Jews do not drive, a young Arab drove through a Jewish neighborhood on his way home from work. A group of Jewish youth, incensed by this affront to their observance, attacked the Arab. When word of the attack spread to the Arab community, a riot ensued. Over the next four days and nights the violence resulted in the destruction of cars, the burning of tires and the arrest of a number of Jews and Arabs. The houses of two Arab residents were burned.
Israeli political leaders have expressed shock that such a thing could happen in Israel. While some on the far right have advocated expelling Arabs from Acre, most leaders have tried to restore coexistence. Feelings are running so high, however, that the Jewish leaders have refused to meet with their Arab neighbors.
All this misses the larger question. What is the role of Muslims and Christians in a state defined as a “Jewish state”? Unless a satisfactory answer is found to this question, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may well be right. The Jewish state may disappear from the pages of history.

Engaging Iran

During last week’s Presidential debate, one of the clear differences between the candidates was their approach to Iran. Senator McCain was a forceful advocate of continuing the policy of confrontation that was the policy in place during President Bush’s first term. Senator Obama, on the other hand, advocated for a policy of engagement to help resolve the disputes between the countries.
A policy of engagement has begun to emerge during Bush’s second term as the neo-conservatives in the Defense Department and Vice President Cheney’s office have begun to lose influence. This change has manifested itself in such things as the direct participation of senior diplomat Nicholas Burns in nuclear talks with Iran and the floating of an initiative to establish a US Interest Section in Tehran.
The Interest Section is a small, but important, step as it will bring American diplomats to Iran to begin to better understand the complex dynamics of Iran and will make it easier for Iranians and Americans to get visas and encourage interaction among ordinary citizens.
This week, in an extended interview with Iranian English language paper, Iran Daily (The article is here.), Gary Sick, a member of the Security Council under President Clinton and currently Professor of International Affairs at Columbia, raised the possibility that President Bush would take advantage of the window of opportunity between the elections and the inauguration of the new president to open the Interest Section.
This time period is a “window of opportunity” for three reasons.
Number one, the elections are over (unless we are still counting ballots in Florida) and therefore campaign politics will not come into play. Doing it before the elections would give Obama a chance to say; “I told you so. Even President Bush agrees that we should engage Iran”.
Number two, Congress will most likely be out of town for the holidays. This is important because the MEK (Mujahedin e’ Khalq), the violent Iranian opposition group advocating for a hard-line policy of regime change in Iran, has the best Congressmen money can buy on their side. They would try to prevent engagement.
Number three, doing it before the new President takes office would create “facts on the ground” which would be hard for a new President to reverse even if he wanted to.
It will be interesting to see what happens.