The State of Play in Syria

Since the diplomatic agreement, orchestrated by Russia, to destroy the Syrian chemical stockpiles has moved forward, the bloody civil war in Syria has receded from the front pages of western media. Despite this lack of media coverage, the war and the killing have proceeded apace. With the hysteria surrounding chemical weapons gone, now might be a good time to examine the state of affairs in this unfortunate country.

Observers on the ground in Syria are reporting a dramatic change in the capability of the Syrian armed forces. When Hezbollah and the Iranian al Quds forces arrived on the scene a year or so ago, they were appalled at the state of the Syrian Army. They found a Syrian Army that was poorly led, undisciplined and more designed to repress the ordinary Syrian citizens than to fight an organized, well-armed rebel force. Today the army is well led and motivated and has made significant progress toward recovering territory lost to the rebels in the early days of the rebellion.

While some of their supply lines from Jordan and Lebanon have been cut by the Syrian Army, the rebel armies are being resupplied through Turkey with arms, ammunition and reinforcements by Saudi Arabia and its western allies. The reinforcements consist of Sunni jihadists recruited around the globe including in the U.S. and the U.K. Many of these militants have been trained in Jordanian training camps financed by Saudi Arabia. The fact that there have been mergers and alliances between opposition groups reflects, not unity, but division into competing camps with some of them allied with al Qaeda. The al Qaeda connection, combined with the fact that some of the fighters are British and American citizens with the ability to travel to and from their native countries. is worrisome to policy makers.

With this worry in mind, international politics is moving more in the direction of the Assad regime. Western powers are beginning to see Assad as the lesser of two evils. European countries are exploring the possibility of reopening ties to the Syrian government. Since Russia saved President Obama from himself by negotiating a diplomatic solution to the chemical weapons issue and taken military action off the table, the U.S. has gone from a policy of “regime change” to “no policy”. The U.S. appears to have outsourced its Syrian policy to Russia. Sergei Lavrov and Vladimir Putin are taking the lead in the thankless job of resolving the Syrian mess.

With territory moving back forth between the rebel forces and the Syrian Army, Damascus being relatively normal, except for the occasional terrorist attack and the divisions within the rebel groups, the situation appears to be in stalemate. Civil wars generally end in one of three ways. One side wins and the war is over. There is a negotiated agreement to allow power or territory sharing. The war goes on until everybody is tired of the bloodshed and the fighting stops. With the outside interventions, the possibility of one side winning appears remote. With the divisions within the rebel forces the idea of a successful peace conference is unlikely. The killing will probably go one for a long time, until both sides are exhausted.

Technorati Tags: Syria,Middle East

Questions and Answers on Syria

 

When the Obama administration began its march toward war with Syria last month, there were numerous questions that were begging for answers. During the weeks of debate, posturing and political maneuvering that have followed, some answers have become more clear and some remain obscured. The initial question for me was what is the evidence that the chemical attack in the suburbs of Damascus was perpetrated by the Assad government? Secretary of State John Kerry has tried to make the case that the links to Assad are undeniable, but no evidence has been produced to substantiate this claim. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of the carefully worded unclassified Intelligence Estimate often cited in support of the war, which seems more designed to obscure the facts than to elucidate them. (See here) We are being asked to accept the administration’s judgment on faith. After the Iraq fiasco, this is hard for me. Acceptance is especially difficult since administration officials have told media outlets that the evidence is not a “slam dunk”. (See here)

A second question is what are the strategic outcomes that the administration intends to achieve? This question has had many answers depending on who is answering, when and to whom they are speaking. The answers cover a broad ground; limited strikes to punish the regime, targeted strikes to degrade the regime’s capabilities, strikes intended to shift the military balance and bring the parties to the negotiating table, regime change, send a message to Iran, weaken Iran and Hezbollah in order to protect Israel, uphold U.S. credibility (whatever that means) and prevent a political defeat for Obama. The list grows longer by the day. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in a rare moment of candor, when asked by Senator Bob Corker about the administration’s strategic objectives, Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey replied “I can’t answer that question”.

The answer to the question, how has the U.S. prepared to deal with the unintended consequences of war with Syria, is even less clear. These consequences are numerous. Al Akbar reports, “Informed insiders have confirmed that Syria and Hezbollah plan to retaliate against Israel in the event of an American-led military attack on Syria. Says one, ‘If even one US missile hits Syria, we will take this battle to Israel’.” (See here) If the attacks turn the tide of the civil war will Iran intervene to aid Assad? If the rebels carry the day and begin a raft of revenge killings, how will the U.S respond? Russia has moved warships to the eastern Mediterranean. How will they respond? U.S. intelligence has claimed that, in the event of an attack, Iran has instructed its allies in Iraq and Lebanon to strike at U.S. targets. If the Assad regime loses control of chemical and biological weapons to the al Qaeda linked rebels, how will the U.S. respond? There is no mood in Russia, China or Iran to give the U.S. an easy win. It is instructive of the administration position, that, again in a rare moment of candor, Secretary of State John Kerry responding to a question about the usefulness of a ban on the use of ground troops in the Senate war resolution, said "I don't want to take off the table an option that might or might not be available to a president of the United States to secure our country”.

As former British intelligence officer Alistair Crooke points out in his always insightful commentary, “The precise consequences from lobbing cruise missiles can never be foreseen, and although always, before the event, such interventions are assumed to be quick and painless, it seldom turns out that way in practice”.

Photo by White House

Technorati Tags: Syria,Obama,Middle East

Who Benefits?

As the U.S. and its allies move on what appears to be an inevitable march toward war in Syria, it seems that it might be useful to examine what Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the known knowns, the known unknowns and unknown unknowns. After all the blustery rhetoric from the western powers over the last days, it appears unlikely that they can now back away from war without politically “appearing weak”.

As I write this, it seems that the known knowns are that a horrific chemical attack occurred outside of Damascus last week which resulted in the deaths of many people including women and children. Among the many known unknowns are who in fact initiated this attack and what they expected to gain from it. Phyllis Bennis writes a cogent analysis of this issue on commondreams.org (the whole post is here) which I excerpt below.

“But who benefits is a little more complicated.

It’s certainly not impossible that the Syrian regime, known to have had a chemical weapons arsenal, used such a weapon. If so, why? Despite remaining under pressure from sanctions and facing increasing international isolation, Damascus has been seeing some success on the battlefield. It’s certainly possible a mid-level Syrian officer, worried about some past defeat and desperately afraid of being held accountable for it, might have chosen to use such a weapon to gain a gruesome battlefield victory despite the increase in the threat of direct military intervention. But it is very unlikely the regime’s leadership would have made such a choice. Not because they “wouldn’t kill their own people,” they’ve been doing just that. But because they stood to lose far more than any potential gain. It’s not impossible. But as brutal as this regime is, it isn’t crazy. It’s unlikely.

Then there’s the other side, the diverse opposition whose strongest fighters are those claiming allegiance to al Qaeda and similar extremist organizations. Those who benefit from this attack, are those eager for greater US and western military intervention against the Assad regime in Damascus. Further, al Qaeda and its offshoots have always been eager to get the US military—troops, warplanes, ships, bases, whatever—into their territory. It makes it so much easier to attack them there. Politically it remains what US counter-intelligence agents long ago called a “recruitment tool” for al Qaeda. They loved the Iraq war for that reason. They would love the Syrian war all the more if US targets were brought in. All the debate about “red lines,” the domestic and international political pressure to “do something,” the threats to the UN inspectors on the ground—who inside Syria do we think is cheering that on?

(And as for the opposition’s capacity and/or willingness to use such weapons…we should also remember that the opposition includes some defectors. Who knows what skills and weapons access they brought with them? And do we really doubt that al Qaeda wanna-be extremists, many of them not even Syrians, would hesitate to kill civilians in a suburb of Damascus?)”

The unknown unknowns are what the consequences of a military strike will be. No war plan survives the first contact with the enemy. As I drove home today, I saw a sign saying “War used to be the name of a card game”. Oh for those simpler days.

 

Technorati Tags: Syria,Chemical weapons

The Death of Sykes-Picot

Following WW I (the “war to end all wars”) British Diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot negotiated the now infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was intended to divide up the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence. The resulting hodgepodge of artificial entities controlled by London and Paris was a recipe for conflict from the start. The borders and installed governments largely ignored tribal, ethnic, sectarian and geographic realities in establishing the entities. As David Fromkin points out in his seminal book “A Peace to End All Peace”, “It (the agreement) showed that Sir Mark Sykes and his colleagues had adopted policies for the Middle East without first considering whether, in existing conditions, they could feasibly be implemented…and suggested the extent to which the British government did not know what it was getting into when it decided to supersede the Ottoman Empire in Asia…” Now, after almost 100 years of ongoing turmoil, we are witnessing the violent collapse of the ill-conceived political structure in the region.

Of the entities that remained after Sykes – Picot, only Egypt and Iran had any semblance of the characteristics of a nation-state. While Iran is home to numerous ethnic groups, it is united by its overwhelming Shia Muslim character. As the recent Iranian election of Hassan Rowhani with high voter turnout demonstrates, Iran’s system of integrating Islamic governance and participatory politics continues to have the support of most Iranians living in the country. Iran is emerging as a more confident and cohesive state. Egypt on the other hand is falling apart before our eyes.

The overthrow of the democratically elected, Muslim Brotherhood led government by the Egyptian military and its co-conspirators in the Egyptian deep state seems to herald the end of the brief Egyptian experiment with democracy. As a result the Muslim Brotherhood’s mode of coming to power by nonviolently, incrementally invading the centers of governance has been discredited. The al Qaeda “idea” of creating an atmosphere of strife and civil disorder as a vehicle for allowing local Islamic groups to come to power through the collapse of the nation-state has gained more credibility. As western democracies tire of the ongoing strife, the resulting “emirates” will be able to throw off the remnants of western hegemony. Al Qaeda can now plausibly say “I told you so”.

The Syrian civil war is likely to result in the breakup of the Syrian state which will spill over into Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. The ethnic Kurds whose nation-state aspirations were ignored by Sykes – Picot will probably reassert themselves in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and possibly Iran. The autocratic Gulf Monarchies of Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia and their partner in Jordan are torn between the need to support their Sunni “takfiri” co-religionists among the Syrian rebels with the possibility of jihadist blowback among their own dissidents and their hatred for Shia Iran. They seem to have decided to double down in Syria while repressing dissent at home.

Whatever the final outcome, it seems certain that the Sykes-Picot construct, which never evolved into a social contract between governments and governed, is doomed to collapse. U.S. policy makers have no good options and little influence. Intervention will likely make a bad situation worse. It won’t be pretty.

Technorati Tags: Middle East,Egypt,Syria

Is there a Syrian Strategy?

Last week, after much debate and hand ringing, the Obama administration announced that the U.S. would begin to directly arm the Syrian rebel forces. The announcement was made in such a manner that it obscured more that clarified U.S. policy with respect to this bloody two year conflict. It remains vague what sort of weapons will be supplied, who will receive them, how they will be supplied and what is the expected outcome of this step. It appears that the announcement is mostly a political move by the administration to counter the barrage of criticism that it has received from friend and foe for failing to be more aggressive in supporting the rebels. The announcement focused exclusively on tactics and did nothing to clarify U.S. strategy.

The Assad regime and its supporters, however, appear to have a clear strategy. It is evident that Hezbollah and Iran see the collapse of the Assad government and its replacement by an unfriendly government dominated by radical Sunni fundamentalists as an existential threat. Iran relies on Hezbollah to provide a deterrent force to prevent an Israeli attack and Hezbollah relies on a continuing flow of arms from Iran through Syria to enable them to prevent an Israeli attack on Lebanon. They, therefore, appear committed to doing everything possible to prevent the fall of Assad. Iran is providing arms and advisors and Hezbollah is providing leadership and well trained and effective urban fighters. Their strategy is to recapture critical roads, junctions and population centers in order to prevent the flow of arms and fighters to the rebel armies. In this they have been quite successful.

In the face of this progress by the Assad forces, it unclear how the U.S. arms policy can have much effect. The fundamentalist Gulf monarchies, led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have been supplying arms and fighters for months with little to show for it. Assad and his allies have succeeded in cutting supply routes from Jordan and Lebanon. The only remaining route is through Turkey and Turkey is facing own political upheaval and the AKP government’s support for the rebels is increasing unpopular as the fighting spills over into Turkish territory. The rebel’s efforts have been reduced to conducting terrorist attacks in Syrian cities.

If this modest step by Obama has little or no effect, the pressure will increase to “do more”. If the strategy is to overthrow Assad, success will require increasing military intervention, which will risk entering a quagmire or a potential confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah and possibly Russia. If the strategy is to bleed Iran and Hezbollah until they are too weak to resist the U.S./Israel, we need to be prepared for more stories of bloodshed and refugees over a long period of time. If we are looking for a negotiated settlement, we will need to include Iran in the negotiations and be prepared for a settlement that leaves a government acceptable to Iran in power. Whatever the strategy, the American people deserve to know what it is and the consequences of that choice.

Photo by ibtimes.co.uk

Technorati Tags: Syria Civil War,U.S. Foreign Policy,Middle East

When Will We Ever Learn

A recent article written by Franklin Lamb, an American journalist and researcher based in Lebanon commenting on the anniversary of the tragic bombing of the U.S Embassy in Beirut. He puts this event in larger perspective.

Beirut -- This observer has no idea if the American Ambassador here in Beirut, Maura Connelly or Secretary of State John Kerry has ever listened to Marlene Dietrich’s classic October 1965 performance of Pete Seeger’s “Where Have All The Flowers Gone,” still stunning, deeply moving and available on the Internet. (here)

But on this 30th anniversary of the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut I found myself near the old embassy site on the sea front for personal reasons, and stepped down the block below the American University of Beirut to meet a friend at Starbucks. When I entered, maybe the 5th time in my life

I have been to a Starbucks since I don’t drink coffee and for political reasons tend to avoid the chain, I noticed someone was playing Dietrich’s classic.

Having just read reports in the Lebanese media concerning the American Ambassador and Secretary of State’s political comments on the embassy events, three decades on, Marlene’s enchanting, deep voiced, “When will they ever learn,?” numbed me.

Kerry slammed Hezbollah in the Lebanese media, saying “On this 30th anniversary of the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, the United States celebrates 30 years of close cooperation with the people of Lebanon that proves the enemies of democracy failed,” he said from

Washington, "especially at the people-to-people level, and this proves the terrorists' goals were not achieved.”

For her part, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Maura Connelly said the bombing opened a new chapter in America’s history in the Middle East. Connelly said the explosion taught Americans that “peaceful intentions were not enough to protect us from those who would use terror to achieve their aims in the Middle East.”

What both officials avoid mentioning is the subject of who was committing the terrorism in Lebanon when these events, including the US Marine Barracks and the Embassy again in 1984, occurred.

Regarding Hezbollah, which would not be a formed organization ready to announce itself publicly until 1985, CIA operative Robert Baer and his team assigned to investigate the Embassy bombing concluded there was not enough reliable evidence to support the theory that the Party of God was responsible. Among the more than three dozen militias of various persuasions operating in Beirut alone in the early 1980’s, only Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

The American officials also failed to take into consideration the fact, never denied by Washington, that at that time the US Embassy had the largest contingent of CIA agents working out of the Embassy and performing command and control functions for the US Marine base in South Beirut, more in fact than in any other capital city except Moscow. When the US Embassy became a command post, by the terms of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations it lost its protected status.

The US Marines as a hostile military force in Lebanon never had adequate protection, and by targeting civilians, its base near the airport became a legitimate target. Contrary to the political spin put on the event, there was no terrorism involved in the operation.

The reason is because, despite Reagan administration claims, and this week's assertion by Ambassador Connelly, the US forces were not “a neutral peacekeeping unit” as hyped. Rather, they were enemy combatants fighting and killing on one side of a civil war conflict. When the battleship New Jersey's shells killed hundreds of people, mostly Shiites and Druze, that fact was clear. It's not surprising that in his memoir, General Colin Powell, at the time an assistant to Caspar Weinberger noted that "When the shells started falling on the Shiites, they assumed the American ‘referee’ had taken sides."

Some examples. On 14 December, 1983 the New Jersey fired 11 projectiles from three of her 16 inch (406 mm) guns at the rate of three per minute each at positions inland of Beirut. These were the first 16 inch shells fired for effect anywhere in the world since New Jersey ended her time on the gun line in Vietnam in 1969.

According to news accounts by reporters in Beirut at the time, the New Jersey bombardment sometimes began at 1:25 P.M. and ended at 11 P.M. followed by American fighter-bombers which could be heard flying over Beirut in search of targets.

On September 19, 1983, the New Jersey and other US warships began shelling Druze, Syrian and Palestinian positions in the Chouf Mountains outside Beirut. The battleship New Jersey with its 2,700 pound shells ("flying Volkswagens") led the action. And on 8 February 1984, the New Jersey fired almost 300 shells at Druze and Shi'ite positions in the hills overlooking Beirut. More of the massive projectiles rained down on the Bekaa valley east of Beirut and constituted the heaviest shore bombardment since the Korean War.

The inaccuracy of New Jersey's guns was a scandal in US government circles and was consistently called into question. An investigation, led by Marine colonel Don Price, into New Jersey's gunfire effectiveness in Lebanon found that many of the ship's shells had missed their targets by as much as 10,000 yards (9,144 meters) and therefore may have inadvertently killed civilians. Records and oral hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the matter could not be clearer, and Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Connelly know this. Tim McNulty, a correspondent for the Chicago Tribune based in Lebanon at the time wrote: "Everybody loved the New Jersey until she fired her guns. Once she fired, it was obvious she couldn't hit anything,” Well, as the citizens of Lebanon know, it did indeed hit things mainly innocent civilians, their property and Lebanon’s infrastructure.

As Secretary of State Kerrey knows well from his nearly three decades in the US Senate and his four years (2009-2013) as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee the actions of the USS New Jersey itself was arguably terrorism and some experts in the International Law Bureau of the Pentagon have said as much.

This observer lived for more than a year in the Chouf village of Choueifat, a beautiful place set high above the remains of the US marine barracks, the Beirut airport and the Mediterranean Sea where the USS Jersey and other US Sixth fleet warships are normally positioned when they come calling on Lebanon.

Neighbors still recall what some here call, “the terror days of USS New Jersey” and its shelling with both 26 inch and 19 inch shells, the former weighing up to 2,700 pounds. Clearly visible around Choueifat and dozens of other smaller towns, are the remains of houses and buildings not yet repaired from the devastation caused by the intense shelling. Also visible at various locations are indications that unexploded shells even now remain imbedded in the ground.

One wonders if as part of the "special enduring friendship between the United States and Lebanon on a people to people level” that the president might order the Pentagon to defuse and remove these huge unexploded bombs. If so he would distinguish his administration from that of the occupiers of Palestine who for more than three decades have targeted various parts of Lebanon with American supplied and US taxpayer-paid weapons, including literally millions of US-made cluster bombs during the 33 day Israeli aggression in 2006.

It is certainly appropriate to honor the victims of the 1983, but it is no less appropriate to honor the other tragedies in Lebanon during this period under review that precipitated it. In her closing remarks this week, Ambassador Connelly noted that in her opinion, “the bombing of the US Embassy taught us the stakes of involvement in this region.”

Has it?

As we contemplate another “neutral peacekeeping presence” being planned in Washington for Syria, we gravely doubt that it has.

When will we ever learn?

After the Election:What Now?

After months of campaign wrangling, the presidential election is now behind us and we are left with the question: What will US Middle East policy look like going forward? Since the election campaign was largely devoid of any discussion or debate on policy options, pundits are left to speculate based on a combination of hope, realities and educated guesses. Some things are clear. The major winner from the election outcome was Nate Silver, the NY Times statistics blogger, (See here) who got the results exactly right. (Close, but never in doubt.) The major loser was Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who bet big time on the wrong horse. On everything else we can only speculate and wait and see what will happen. In general, not much is likely to change.

The Syrian civil war drags on with the death toll on all sides rising with each passing day. Obama has little choice but to support the rebels rhetorically and with some modest aid, while relying on the wealthy Gulf States to do the heavy lifting of arming the rebels. There is no mood in the US to get entangled in another Middle East ground conflict. Iran and its allies will continue to support the Assad regime. Any negotiated settlement would require engagement with Iran. This would acknowledge Iran’s role as a regional player and is an anathema to Washington’s foreign policy wizards. The biggest losers will be the Syrian people.

The so called “Arab Awakening” will likely continue on its own path with the US having little influence on the outcomes. The road to functioning democracies in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya will be bumpy with an ending that is not likely to be friendly to US ambitions for regional control. There is not much that the US can do to influence the ending except to continue to support them and hope for the best. Hopefully, Congress will not mess it up.

As the “Arab Awakening” spreads to authoritarian US allies in the Gulf region and Jordan, the US will face some uncomfortable choices. With US bases in place and the US requiring Arab support for its anti-Iran policies, the policy has been to offer soft encouragement for reform, but no direct regime criticism. As the regimes crack down more aggressively on dissidents, (See here and here) this policy may become more untenable. Again, I expect that the US will continue current policies and hope for the best.

In Israel/Palestine, Prime Minister Netanyahu has lost all credibility with the Obama administration. His antics have left him on the outside looking in. However, I believe that Obama has realized that a “two state solution” is no longer possible. Given Israeli intransigence and control of Congress, and Palestinian divisions, there is not much that he can do to change the situation. Again, he will continue to be disengaged and hope for the best.

Iran probably offers the best opportunity for improvement. The Iranians have signaled their willingness to compromise by softening their rhetoric, transferring some of their 20% enriched uranium to civilian uses and offering to suspend enrichment to higher levels. (See here) If the US responds in-kind, the upcoming talks may bear some fruit. The Iranians, however, will not move without some reduction in sanctions. Given that Congress controls the sanctions regime, Obama will have little ability to negotiate in good faith on sanctions. Promising to consider reducing sanctions at some time in the future will not cut it.

All of this ignoring the problems and hoping for the best, reminds me of the Bill Clinton administration when President Clinton told a State Department official that he was not particularly interested in foreign policy issues because none of his voters were interested. The response was “Sometimes, Mr. President, foreign policy issues find you.” Usually at the most inopportune time.

 

Technorati Tags: Middle East,Election,Obama