Close But No Cigar

Last week, after three days of intense negotiations between the EU3+3 and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the participants announced that they had failed to reach an agreement and departed Geneva saying that negotiations would reconvene on November 20 at a lower level. Throughout the negotiation process there had been much optimism and speculation that an agreement was possible. Speculation reached a fever pitch when senior diplomats from most of the participating countries flew to Geneva in order to join in the negotiations. (This is usually a sign that a photo op is imminent.) While exact reason for the collapse of the negotiating process is unclear as of this writing, it appears that we have shifted from a negotiating mode to a blame game mode.

Most of the day on Saturday was spent, not on negotiations with the Iranians, but on negotiations within the EU3+3, trying to iron out their internal disagreements. Contemporaneous reports and leaks by diplomats and reporters on the scene in Geneva stated that France was responsible for the lack of agreement. France was insisting that the interim agreement be rewritten in order to include a Iranian commitment to stop construction of the Arak heavy water reactor. The reason for taking this position is mystifying. While a heavy water reactor is a proliferation concern, as it produces weapons grade plutonium, the Arak facility is over a year away from being completed and another year away from making enough plutonium to produce a weapon. The proposed agreement is a six month reversible interim agreement. This week Secretary of State Kerry, concerned that France was being blamed, announced that Iran was to blame for the failure when it backed away from language concerning their right to enrichment. It sounds to me like revisionist diplomacy and amateur hour at the State Department.

In order to understand why assessing blame is politically important, it is helpful to look at the history. In 2004, under President Khatami, Iran offered to cap its centrifuges at 3000 and it had very little low enriched uranium. This offer was rejected by the U.S. By 2009 Iran had over 7000 centrifuges and 1000 kg of low enriched uranium. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad agreed to ship the low enriched uranium out of the country and have it reprocessed into fuel for the Tehran medical reactor. However, faced with political turmoil following the disputed election, Iran reneged. This deal was revived by Turkey and Brazil in 2010 and this time it was rejected by the U.S. Today Iran has almost 20,000 centrifuges and more than 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium and hundreds of kg of 20% enriched uranium. During this period, the U.S. has implemented a series of draconian economic sanctions on Iran and bullied other countries into going along. The sanctions have dramatically affected the lives of ordinary Iranians and have had no effect on Iran’s nuclear program.

If the U.S. and its allies are seen as not serious about a diplomatic solution, the countries that are cooperating on sanctions may begin to take a different stance. This is especially true if Congress continues to take a “war hawk” position and doubles down on sanctions. If the sanctions regime falls apart, the U.S. has no viable option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program other than military action. The current round of diplomacy is possibly the last, best chance for a diplomatic solution. Unfortunately, Ambassador John Limbert’s fifth rule of U.S. – Iranian relations is still in effect. “Whenever you seem to be making progress, someone or some diabolical coincidence will mess it up”.

(Photo by Yahoo! News)

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