As the Obama administration conducted its promised reassessment of the situation in Afghanistan, it faced three basic options for moving forward to deal with this intractable problem. The overall US strategic interest, as Obama has indicated on several occasions, is to prevent organizations with global reach, such as al Qaeda, from using Afghanistan as a base from which to attack US interests around the world.
One option is to scale back ambitions and restrict activities to those that would insure that Afghanistan is not used as an al Qaeda sanctuary. A second option is to mount a large scale counter insurgency effort utilizing large numbers of US/NATO troops to defeat the Taliban, create a large economic development effort and install a friendly government. The third option is to boost US commitment to train Afghan police and security forces to allow them to assume the primary role in the conflict.
Each of these options has risks, advantages and problems. In today’s announcement regarding the way forward in Afghanistan, the Obama administration appears to have signed up for the third option.
The first option would have required admitting defeat and conducting a long term campaign of military attacks and covert actions which would undermine and destabilize the Afghan government. It appears that this endless conflict was not palatable politically.
The second option would have required a large commitment of US/NATO combat forces for a long period of time. The administration would have faced escalating US casualties. Also, providing logistical support to a large combat force would also have been a daunting task. The Taliban has shown an increasing capability to interdict the current supply route through Pakistan and the Khyber Pass. The present alternate overland route through Russia and Central Asia is difficult and limited to “non-lethal” material. The best alternative for a massive logistical effort utilizes the Iranian port of Chabaher on the Gulf of Oman and the existing Indian/Iranian constructed highway into Afghanistan. For this overt cooperation with the US, Iran surely would have extracted major concessions on other issues that would have been politically difficult for the US.
The third option, while eliminating the downsides of the other two, has its own issues. Standing up the Afghan security forces will be difficult, time consuming and expensive. While many of the insurgents and their supporters, both within and outside of the security forces, are not ideological supporters of the Taliban, they do fear Taliban retribution and support them for economic reasons (They pay better.). Countering this will require establishing security, destroying the drug trade (the major source of Taliban funding), eliminating Taliban bases in Pakistan and co-opting low and middle level Taliban. Ongoing attacks inside Pakistan to eliminate bases, with the resulting civilian casualties, run the risk of destabilizing nuclear armed Pakistan.
What ever the option, the road out of this mess will be long and hard.
Friday, March 27, 2009
Sunday, March 22, 2009
The Gaza War and Natural Gas
When Israel attacked Gaza late last year its objectives were always a bit murky. As with the US invasion of Iraq the objectives seemed to change as the war went along. Two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities the Israeli government was still mulling its objectives.
The stated objectives were to stop Hamas rocket fire into Israel, to stop smuggling from Egypt into Gaza and to restore the deterrent strength of the IDF. It was clear from the beginning that none of these could be accomplished with a short term incursion into Gaza. So what was going on?
As with most conflicts in this region the answer is “oil” or in this case natural gas.
In 2000, British Gas Group (BG) discovered proven gas reserves of at least 1.3 trillion cubic feet beneath Gazan territorial waters worth nearly $4 billion. A consortium which includes BG and the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF), a joint venture between the Palestinian Authority and wealthy Palestinian businessmen was formed to develop the resource. The agreement would have resulted in the sale of gas to Israel.
Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza in 2005 and the Hamas victory in Palestinian elections in 2006 threw the whole plan into disarray. The Israeli withdrawal made any Israeli legal claims to the resource suspect and Hamas control of the PA would result in funds from Israel reaching Hamas and Gaza and would undermine Israel’s policies toward Hamas.
The only remaining choices for Israel were to either completely destroy Hamas or, failing that, to totally destroy the infrastructure in Gaza in order to prevent a Hamas led government from developing the resource. The enormous destruction of infrastructure during the war and the blockade of all materials necessary to rebuild seems to have accomplished the objective.
Some sources believe that Israel is already “slant drilling” from their adjacent gas fields into the Palestinian fields. It is difficult to verify such claims as Israel has declared this a “closed military area”.
If one is asked a question about why something is happening in the Middle East most people will answer “religion”. A better answer is “oil”.
The stated objectives were to stop Hamas rocket fire into Israel, to stop smuggling from Egypt into Gaza and to restore the deterrent strength of the IDF. It was clear from the beginning that none of these could be accomplished with a short term incursion into Gaza. So what was going on?
As with most conflicts in this region the answer is “oil” or in this case natural gas.
In 2000, British Gas Group (BG) discovered proven gas reserves of at least 1.3 trillion cubic feet beneath Gazan territorial waters worth nearly $4 billion. A consortium which includes BG and the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF), a joint venture between the Palestinian Authority and wealthy Palestinian businessmen was formed to develop the resource. The agreement would have resulted in the sale of gas to Israel.
Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza in 2005 and the Hamas victory in Palestinian elections in 2006 threw the whole plan into disarray. The Israeli withdrawal made any Israeli legal claims to the resource suspect and Hamas control of the PA would result in funds from Israel reaching Hamas and Gaza and would undermine Israel’s policies toward Hamas.
The only remaining choices for Israel were to either completely destroy Hamas or, failing that, to totally destroy the infrastructure in Gaza in order to prevent a Hamas led government from developing the resource. The enormous destruction of infrastructure during the war and the blockade of all materials necessary to rebuild seems to have accomplished the objective.
Some sources believe that Israel is already “slant drilling” from their adjacent gas fields into the Palestinian fields. It is difficult to verify such claims as Israel has declared this a “closed military area”.
If one is asked a question about why something is happening in the Middle East most people will answer “religion”. A better answer is “oil”.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Engaging Iran II
During her recent diplomatic tour of Europe and the Middle East, Secretary of State Clinton indicated that Iran would be invited to the upcoming security conference on Afghanistan. This is a positive development as both the US and Iran would like to see a stable Afghanistan which is not governed by the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban and the US and Iran can probably reach some accommodation on dealing with Afghanistan.
Other issues between the US and Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hezbollah will, however, be much more difficult to deal with. When I returned from Iran two years ago people asked me “What do you think about Iran’s nuclear ambitions?” My answer was “I have no idea whether or not Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, but I can understand why they might want them”.
Iran is surrounded by Sunni ruled countries who have been encouraged by the US to be hostile toward Iran and the so-called “Shia crescent”. Iran’s two major adversaries, US and Israel, are nuclear armed and have threatened regime change and a military attack on the Islamic Republic.
Up until now Iran’s strategic defense strategy has been asymmetric. Rather than relying on their conventional forces, Iran has armed and aided Hamas and Hezbollah in order to threaten Israel should either the US or Israel attack. It has also encouraged and supported Muslim Brotherhood related Islamist opposition groups in Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan who are allied with the US. A nuclear capability would give Iran a deterrent defense capability that did not rely on Hezbollah and Hamas or political unrest in the Arab world.
If the US is to be able to convince Iran to change its strategic calculations, there will need to be a major change in American policies toward Iran. Iran will need to be persuaded that the US no longer desires regime change and has taken the military option off the table. They will also expect that the US will demonstrate that it is able to control Israel. (This is a difficult task given likelihood of an Israeli government led by Bibi Netanyahu.)
In view of the large population of neo-liberals and AIPAC supporters of Likud’s hard-line Israeli policies within the Obama administration, it is unlikely that such a major policy shift can occur. So far the US talk has continued to be about “carrots and sticks” to which the Iranian response has been “carrots and sticks are for donkeys”. We will, therefore, likely see a continuation of the adversarial stalemate brought about by the policies of the last 30 years with its adverse implications for stability in the region.
Other issues between the US and Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hezbollah will, however, be much more difficult to deal with. When I returned from Iran two years ago people asked me “What do you think about Iran’s nuclear ambitions?” My answer was “I have no idea whether or not Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, but I can understand why they might want them”.
Iran is surrounded by Sunni ruled countries who have been encouraged by the US to be hostile toward Iran and the so-called “Shia crescent”. Iran’s two major adversaries, US and Israel, are nuclear armed and have threatened regime change and a military attack on the Islamic Republic.
Up until now Iran’s strategic defense strategy has been asymmetric. Rather than relying on their conventional forces, Iran has armed and aided Hamas and Hezbollah in order to threaten Israel should either the US or Israel attack. It has also encouraged and supported Muslim Brotherhood related Islamist opposition groups in Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan who are allied with the US. A nuclear capability would give Iran a deterrent defense capability that did not rely on Hezbollah and Hamas or political unrest in the Arab world.
If the US is to be able to convince Iran to change its strategic calculations, there will need to be a major change in American policies toward Iran. Iran will need to be persuaded that the US no longer desires regime change and has taken the military option off the table. They will also expect that the US will demonstrate that it is able to control Israel. (This is a difficult task given likelihood of an Israeli government led by Bibi Netanyahu.)
In view of the large population of neo-liberals and AIPAC supporters of Likud’s hard-line Israeli policies within the Obama administration, it is unlikely that such a major policy shift can occur. So far the US talk has continued to be about “carrots and sticks” to which the Iranian response has been “carrots and sticks are for donkeys”. We will, therefore, likely see a continuation of the adversarial stalemate brought about by the policies of the last 30 years with its adverse implications for stability in the region.
Saturday, March 07, 2009
Diplo-speak
As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton completes her first visit to the Middle East, it appears to me that she must have been issued a dictionary and a handbook on her first day at Foggy Bottom giving her words and methods to say absolutely nothing of meaning. Her predecessor, Condi Rice, when asked about the ongoing expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, would say that they were “unhelpful” to the Peace Process. When asked about Israeli government plans to demolish 80+ Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem, Secretary Clinton allowed that this was “unhelpful” to the Peace Process.
She also appears to have trained her people very well. The Israeli government has refused allow pasta and copy paper into Gaza on security grounds. Evidently the Israelis believe that Hamas has developed technology to produce a spaghetti bomb and is capable of attacking Israel with paper airplanes. State Department spokesperson Robert Wood carried on this very erudite dialogue with the press corps at a recent press briefing.
QUESTION: But can you imagine any circumstance under which pasta could be considered a dual-use item? Or is there some -- you know, is rigatoni somehow going to be used as a weapon? (Laughter.)
MR. WOOD: I’m not involved in those discussions, so I –
QUESTION: Well, I mean -- I mean, it just seems to be absurd on the face of it, if that’s what happening.
MR. WOOD: Well, there are people on the ground who are dealing with these issues. And I think we should leave it --
QUESTION: Dealing with the pasta dual-use issue?
QUESTION: Yeah, can you take a question on the pasta, please?
MR. WOOD: I’m not going to take the question on the pasta --
QUESTION: Why?
MR. WOOD: -- because it’s –
QUESTION: Well, the United States is obviously pushing it, so obviously it’s something --
MR. WOOD: We’re trying to get humanitarian supplies in – on the ground to the people in Gaza.
QUESTION: Do you think food is a humanitarian supply?
MR. WOOD: Food certainly is.
QUESTION: All kinds of food?
MR. WOOD: I – I’m not able to tell you from here whether it –
QUESTION: Can you get a – can you take the question of what kind of food that the U.S. thinks is a humanitarian supply?
MR. WOOD: I’m not going to take that question, because I don’t think it’s a legitimate question.
QUESTION: You don’t think it’s legitimate that the Palestinians need certain foods and is – should Israel decide what food the Palestinians need?
MR. WOOD: I’m sorry, Elise, I’m not going to – I’ve spoken on it.
It would be funny, if it weren’t so sad.
She also appears to have trained her people very well. The Israeli government has refused allow pasta and copy paper into Gaza on security grounds. Evidently the Israelis believe that Hamas has developed technology to produce a spaghetti bomb and is capable of attacking Israel with paper airplanes. State Department spokesperson Robert Wood carried on this very erudite dialogue with the press corps at a recent press briefing.
QUESTION: But can you imagine any circumstance under which pasta could be considered a dual-use item? Or is there some -- you know, is rigatoni somehow going to be used as a weapon? (Laughter.)
MR. WOOD: I’m not involved in those discussions, so I –
QUESTION: Well, I mean -- I mean, it just seems to be absurd on the face of it, if that’s what happening.
MR. WOOD: Well, there are people on the ground who are dealing with these issues. And I think we should leave it --
QUESTION: Dealing with the pasta dual-use issue?
QUESTION: Yeah, can you take a question on the pasta, please?
MR. WOOD: I’m not going to take the question on the pasta --
QUESTION: Why?
MR. WOOD: -- because it’s –
QUESTION: Well, the United States is obviously pushing it, so obviously it’s something --
MR. WOOD: We’re trying to get humanitarian supplies in – on the ground to the people in Gaza.
QUESTION: Do you think food is a humanitarian supply?
MR. WOOD: Food certainly is.
QUESTION: All kinds of food?
MR. WOOD: I – I’m not able to tell you from here whether it –
QUESTION: Can you get a – can you take the question of what kind of food that the U.S. thinks is a humanitarian supply?
MR. WOOD: I’m not going to take that question, because I don’t think it’s a legitimate question.
QUESTION: You don’t think it’s legitimate that the Palestinians need certain foods and is – should Israel decide what food the Palestinians need?
MR. WOOD: I’m sorry, Elise, I’m not going to – I’ve spoken on it.
It would be funny, if it weren’t so sad.
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