Dealing with tribalism

The western media has, in general, portrayed the recent spate of internecine conflict in Gaza and the West Bank as a political conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Although there is a political component to the conflict, there is also a strong tribal component. One of the things that I quickly learned in my travels in the region is that tribal loyalties trump most other considerations. In Jordan the government defers to tribal leaders to settle many legal disputes.
A few weeks ago in Gaza, following a bombing that killed 5 Hamas fighters and a little girl, the Hamas led government cracked down on the Fatah associated Hilles clan, arresting many of their members and causing others to flee to Israel. Although Hilles members are associated with Fatah, some are Hamas members and in general they act in the best interest of their tribal brothers.
Western leaders have a long history of lack of understanding of tribal loyalties and the complications that they bring to political situations.
In the US this lack of understanding manifested itself early on in relations with Native American tribes. On the Flathead Reservation in Montana, the US government put two tribes, the Salish and Kootenai, historical rivals, on the same reservation and then wondered why they didn’t get along.
The tribal loyalty component that under girds Diaspora Jews’ support for Israel has long been ignored. Judaism began as a tribal religion of place, the Israelite tribe in Palestine. God chose the Israelites as his people and he lived in Jerusalem. After the exile, Judaism lost its attachment to place (although this is returning with the effort to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem so God will have a place to live), but retains its tribal character. Even Christian Zionists appeal to this tribal loyalty. Pastor John Hagee, founder of Christians United for Israel, said in a recent speech “Christians have a debt to Jews for providing the foundation of their religion, because God made a covenant with Israel”.
The arming of Sunni tribes in Iraq against al Quada is a risky strategy because it is not clear to me what the impact will be once al Quada and the US forces are gone and old tribal conflicts resurface. We may be arming all sides of a future civil war.
Until western policy makers exhibit a greater understanding of the influence of tribalism in the Middle East and Africa and take these complications into account, they will continue to “stumble and bumble” through these regions. Things are never as simple as they seem.

The bill is due

During my recent trip to Amman, Jordan, I had the privilege of being able to meet with children of Iraqi refugees who were attending the Episcopal Diocese of the Middle East Bishop’s School. These children were able to attend this fine school because of scholarship support provided by the diocese and other interested patrons. These bright eyed youngsters answered questions and sat politely as a bunch of old people chatted on in a language that they did not understand. (I am not sure that my grandchildren would have done as well.) They put a human face on the Iraqi refugee crisis that is rapidly becoming an embarrassment to the developed world.
The flow of refugees out of Iraq has its roots in the First Gulf War when Iraqi Christians, previously protected by Saddaam Hussein began to be seen as agents of the US and were forced by persecution to flee. Since then nearly 2 million refugees have fled Iraq for Syria and Jordan, two of the poorest countries in the region, in order to escape the violence. Exact numbers are hard to determine as the refugees do not have legal status in either country and cannot legally hold jobs and therefore are reluctant to make their presence known.
Initially the new arrivals were what Jordanians call “Mercedes Refugees”. These were wealthy businessmen and former Baathists who drove up the price of real estate by buying large houses in new developments in West Amman. The surge in refugees following the bombing of the Shiite shrine in Sammara and the resulting outbreak of civil war included the middle and lower classes. These people are now running out of money since they are unable to support themselves. They have no viable options. They can’t go back to Iraq because of the violence; they can’t remain in Jordan because they have no way to support themselves and they can’t go else ware because, with some exceptions, no one will accept them.
The most vulnerable are those who have worked with the US occupation force and with international NGO’s. The US has promised to admit 12000 of these people this year, but to date has admitted only 1700. One small city in Norway has admitted more Iraqis than the entire US. If the rest of the US had resettled as many Iraqis per capita as my small state of Idaho, the US would have met its goal.
When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, NY Times columnist Tom Friedman reminded his readers that the “china shop rule” applies; “if you break, you own it”. The US broke it. Now the bill is due and we are delinquent in our payment.

Risky business

Recent news reports have recounted the intense fighting in al Basra and other southern Iraq cities between Iraqi security forces supported by US and British forces and insurgent Shia militias. It is not clear what precipitated the outbreak of hostilities at this particular time. Some believe that it is an attempt by Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki to burnish his credentials as a tough leader ahead of upcoming elections. Others, including his political rivals, believe that it is an attempt to destroy rival factions before the elections. It also may be an attempt to regain control of oil exports and smuggling through al Basra which is siphoning millions of dollars per day from the national treasury. It probably is some of all of the above. A better way to look at the conflict is a power struggle between rival Shia political groups and criminal gangs. Defeating the forces of “radical cleric” Muqtada al Sadr’s Mehdi Army would solidify the position of Maliki’s Dawa party and their ally SCIRI (aka ICRI) who are already in a strong position because they are supported by both the US and Iran. The whole US backed enterprise, however, is very risky. Number one, it might not even be successful and could lead to the break down of the Mehdi army’s cease fire which has contributed to the reduction of violence over the past few months. If it is successful, it may lead to unintended consequences. SCIRI and Dawa are supporters of the “Biden Plan” which calls for partition of Iraq into Kurd, Sunni and Shia semiautonomous regions. In January SCIRI floated a plan to create a Shia “super province” south of Baghdad (Creatively called “South of Baghdad Region”) similar to the Kurdish region in the north. Muqtada al Sadr on the other hand is more of an Iraqi nationalist who wants US troops out of Iraq and a stronger central government. He is supported in this point of view by moderate Sunni Arabs and secularists. The so called “Biden Plan” may well be the best solution to the Iraq quagmire, but to formally implement it without first agreeing on a plan to share oil revenues is risky business. Control of oil revenues by Kurd and Shia “super provinces” while leaving out the oil deprived Sunni area is an invitation to reignite the Sunni insurgency and escalate the conflict between Sunni Arabs and Kurds over the oil rich Kirkuk region. Be careful what you wish for, you might just get it.

We are a democracy and we are responsible

During my recent trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran, I met two Iraqi retired school teachers during a stop for tea and ice cream. These guys were Shia Muslims from southern Iraq, the folks who had been oppressed by Saddaam Hussein and who were supposed to greet the US invasion with open arms. They were, however, very angry at the US, calling US troops “blood thirsty” and saying that the US won’t help Iraq because “Israel controls the US government”. They said “Why don’t you rise up and overthrow your government?” I tried to explain to them that in the US, the way we “overthrow” the government is through a peaceful process of elections. This did not seem to pacify them much. A few days later, when I was having tea and ice cream with two Iranians (If you see a pattern here, you are right.), we were discussing my observations that both Arabs and Iranians don’t hate Americans. On the contrary they like Americans and admire America’s openness, dynamic economy and innovative technology. They may have some qualms about American culture with its emphasis on materialism and sex and its focus on individualism to the detriment of family and community, but on the whole they have positive feelings about America and Americans. What they hate is the US government and its policies, but they seem to be able to separate Americans from their government. The Iranians agreed with me, but one of them said, “You are right, although that may change. You are a democracy and you are responsible for your government”. As we approach the election season (Seems as though we have been in it forever already.) we should ask ourselves who we want to be making American policies toward the rest of the world, what we want those policies to look like and who we want to be the face of those policies in the world. Depending on the choices that we make, the answer to the question frequently asked after 9/11, “Why do they hate us?” may be easy. We are a democracy and we are responsible.

Is something positive happening?

There seem to be some events happening in the Middle East that give even a pessimist like me some hope that sanity might prevail in the midst of all the past irrationality. The US has said that it will release nine of the Iranian terrorists, spies, diplomats or whatever that we captured, kidnapped, detained or whatever in Iraq over recent months. The holding of these Iranians has been a bone of contention between the US and Iran since it began several months ago. The Iraqi government has supported the Iranian position. In addition, US military spokespersons have indicated that there is evidence of Iran reducing its support for Shia militias within Iraq. Perhaps both countries are beginning to realize that the aggressive confrontation is counter productive. From both the US and Iranian standpoints the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan with the increasing power of the Taliban is dangerous and undesirable. Pakistan and George Bush’s friend, Pervez Mushareff, are becoming less reliable US allies and Pakistan is increasingly in danger of coming under the sway of radical Islamist groups friendly to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. To have both countries bordering Afghanistan be adversaries would be disastrous for the US and NATO. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may have let his celebrity go to his head and overreached. He may have forgotten that the real power in Iran rests with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei. Trying to understand the opaque and factional politics of Iran is hopeless, but criticism of the forced resignation of respected nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani by the Supreme Leader and the critical letter signed by 183 members of the Majlis or Parliament may indicate that Ahmadinejad’s confrontive style may be wearing thin. The conservative pragmatists, such as Hassani Rafsanjani, may be exerting some influence. Hopefully the US will not ignore any overtures from them as we have in the past. In Israel/Palestine the Palestinian Authority is beginning to disarm fighters on the West Bank as Hamas has done in Gaza. If the PA disarms everybody and not just Hamas supporters, it could significantly reduce the violence. The US has condemned (Condemned might be a little strong, but given the usual non reaction towards Israeli behavior it may be descriptive.) Israel’s continued raids into Nablus (a city where security has been turned over to the PA) and the IDF’s confiscation of PA security force equipment. (For this story, click here) If the PA takes more responsibility for its own security and the US takes a more balanced approach, something might come out of the Annapolis meeting. Call me a Pollyanna, but perhaps something positive might be happening. Then again, perhaps not.

Conflicting conflicts

Ever since the US has had a Middle East policy, basically since WW II, it has had difficulty balancing conflicting aspects of their policies. The strategic US Middle East policies, interests and objectives have at times been in conflict and at times been completely opposed. Some would argue that “strategic” and “US Middle East policy” are not words that should be used in the same sentence. I have maintained that Osama Bin Laden has an advantage in his conflict with the US since he has a strategy and the US is completely focused on tactics. The US has even declared war on a tactic, the so called “war on terror”, but that is another story. After 1945, America’s primary objectives in the region were securing Western access to Middle Eastern oil, preventing the Soviet Union from reaping political or strategic advantage in the area, and ensuring Israel’s security. Pursuing the last of these objectives often complicated the pursuit of the other two. Washington’s close relations with Israel generated anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, providing the Soviet Union with opportunities to increase its political influence in the region. Similarly, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to airlift military supplies to Israel prompted oil-producing Arab states to impose an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and some European countries, causing major dislocations in the global economy. As the Cold War drew to an end, the imperative of containing the Soviet Union gave way to two new objectives: combating international terrorism and preventing so called "rogue" states—such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq—from challenging U.S. policies in the region. Both of these objectives have acquired fresh urgency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but Americans disagree over whether the two goals can, or should, be pursued simultaneously. While President George W. Bush argued that the necessity of disarming Iraq and overthrowing its government as well cannot be separated from the effort to defeat Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa‘ida network, others insist that Bush’s preoccupation with Iraq has diverted precious energy and resources from the war against al-Qa‘ida. As in previous decades, Washington finds no easy formulas for pursuing its diverse objectives in the Middle East. A good example is occurring in the region as we speak. The US has objectives in the region of containing and disrupting Iranian influence, supporting the Kurdish regional government in Iraq as a poster child for positive results from the US invasion and occupation and cultivating good relations with Turkey as a moderate Islamic state, a bridge to the Middle East and a conduit for oil and natural gas flow to the west. In order to help accomplish the first objective, the US has supported and armed the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and their affiliate the PJAK in their attacks on Iran. (For this story, click here) This has created the problem that the PKK has used this support and the arms to attack Turkey. (For this story, click here) After numerous deadly cross border raids Turkey has asked the Iraqi central government, the US, and the Kurdish regional government to crack down on PKK bases in Iraq and prevent the attacks across the border. The Iraqi government has no ability to accomplish this as they have limited resources and those that they do have are not allowed to operate in Kurdish areas. The US is unwilling to do anything because they support the PKK attacks on Iran and are reluctant to risk destabilizing the only part of Iraq that shows any signs of progress. The Kurdish regional government has no desire to do anything because their long range objective is an independent greater Kurdistan incorporating the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. The result of all this is that our erstwhile ally, Turkey, and our erstwhile enemy, Iran, are meeting to discuss how to work together to solve their common problem. (For this story, click here) A fine mess, good luck in resolving it.

Do we really pay these guys?

This week The News Hour on PBS did a piece on Iran’s influence in Iraq. The commentators were Ray Takeyh, an Iranian American who is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Peter Rodman former Assistant Secretary of Defense and fellow at the Brookings Institute. (For a transcript of the conversation, click here) Mr. Takeyh and Mr. Rodman did not agree about much as to how the US should deal with Iran regarding Iraq. Mr. Takeyh took the position that the situation was very complicated, but with careful and sophisticated diplomacy, some agreement was possible. Mr. Rodman, for the most part, repeated the US government policy that Iran was responsible for the bad things happening in Iraq and a policy of threats and sanctions was appropriate and necessary. Surprisingly, the one thing that they did seem to agree on was that there was a great amount of convergence between the strategic goals of the US and those of Iran with respect to the situation in Iraq. The US government would like to see a federal state as outlined in the Iraqi constitution with a relatively weak central government and relatively strong provincial or regional governments. They would like to see the democratically elected and Shia dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki succeed in stabilizing the country. They also would like to see the US troops come home. (Maybe) These are essentially the strategic goals of Iran. For 60 years the Israelis and the Palestinians have been unable to reach agreement on their broader goals. Because of this failure all the efforts to talk about process have come to nothing. Here we agree on the broader goals and what remains is to agree on is how to accomplish them. It seems to me that this is what we pay our State Dept. diplomats to do. Instead of laying down a list of a priori demands and insisting that the other party accedes, as US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker did in his recent meetings with Iran, our diplomats should be looking for the common ground. If these people did their job as poorly for me in business as they do for me as part of the government, I would fire the whole lot and start over. Maybe the American people should try that.

Does this make sense?

As part of their campaign to justify invading Iraq, the US government maintained that Saddaam Hussein’s government was aiding Al Qaeda and would provide them WMD from their non-existent stockpiles. I believed the assertion that Iraq had WMD; after all it was a “slam dunk”. (Silly me) However, the Al Qaeda claim never made sense to me. Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal is to establish a Sunni Muslim caliphate in the Middle East and more ambitiously in the world. Saddaam Hussein was secular Baathist Socialist. The last thing he would want to see was an Islamic government in the Middle East. Now, in making the case for war in Iran, the US is accusing Iran of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and aiding insurgent groups in Iraq. The Taliban claim also makes no sense to me. The Taliban is a long standing supporter of Al Qaeda and also wants to see a Sunni Islamic caliphate. Iran is a Shia country and considers the Taliban a dangerous adversary. Based on this view, Iran aided US efforts to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran also has poor relations with Pakistan, a supporter of the Taliban, and an ally of the US. (Huh??) As an Iranian government minister said after Pakistan exploded is first nuclear weapon, “That was a Genii that would have been best left in the bottle”. Why would Iran want to support the Taliban efforts to reestablish an enemy state right on its borders? It makes no sense to me. In terms of Iranian activity in Iraq, the Shia groups that Iran has the most influence are the SCIRI and al Dawa. Both of these groups are part of the US supported government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki. Muktada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army has more of an Iraqi nationalist agenda and is probably not a strong client of Iran. Although weapons may flow across the long and porous border between Iran and Iraq and the Iranian government has many factions with different agendas, it is hard to imagine that the Iranian government would support insurgents fighting against a government made up of the people with whom it has the best relations. Perhaps one of the lessons learned from the Iraq war debacle is that if it doesn’t make sense, perhaps it isn’t true no matter how many times the US government says it.

American logic - an oxymoron?

Former Vice President Al Gore’s most recent book “The Assault on Reason” bemoans the fact that reasoned discourse has been replaced by emotional and ideological responses that are encouraged by mass media and 10 second sound bites. Although many reviewers have suggested that he is making much adieu about nothing and is ignoring the role of emotion in making sound judgments, a look at US Middle East policies leads one to conclude that that he may have a good point. Some examples quickly come to mind.

Support democracy in the Middle East while implementing policies that enrage the general population and expect that they will elect governments that are friendly to the US. (A good example is here)
Support a Shia government in Iraq and at the same time oppose influence and involvement by Shia Iran
Give millions of dollars of weapons to Saudi Arabia and at the same time accuse them of undermining US efforts in Iraq
Encourage a Sunni barrier around the “Shiite Crescent” and expect that there won’t be sectarian rivalry
Support Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and expect that Palestinians will peacefully accept the status quo
Threaten Iran with sanctions, nuclear attack and regime change and expect that talks will encourage them to help the US out of the mess in Iraq
Isolate and starve Palestinians in Gaza and expect that they will blame Hamas rather than the US/Israel (A story about Hamas’s approach in Gaza is here)
Encourage Israel to bomb Lebanon and kill over 1000 civilians and expect that the Lebanese will blame Hezbollah rather than the US/Israel
Exclude Hamas from peace negotiations and expect that any agreement would be supported by the majority of Palestinians who elected them to office

Maybe American logic is an oxymoron.

Everybody is right and wrong

As I prepare for my upcoming trip to the Middle East, including Iran, the current kerfuffle over the detention of 15 British soldiers and sailors by Iran has caused a bit of unease in our group. It doesn't take much research to determine that the situation is a lot less clear than the governments involved would have one believe. Shortly after the incident British Royal Navy Commodore Nick Lambert described the situation as follows: " There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that they were in Iraqi territorial waters. Equally the Iranians may claim that they were Iranian territorial waters. The extent and definition of territorial waters in this part of the world is very complicated." Commodore Lambert has not been heard from since. A quick browse of the book with the intimidating title of "Continental Shelf Delimitation and Related Maritime Issues in the Persian Gulf" makes the description "very complicated" seem like an understatement. Controversial former British diplomat Craig Murray added to the flap by posting an article on his web site under the title "Fake Maritime boundaries". (Click here) The 15 soldiers and sailors have become pawns in the game of power politics. The Iranians are trying to send a message of "don't mess with me". As an Iranian blogger pointed out: "We probably could have avoided all this with the application of a little technology, namely a bull horn. Surely a country that can master nuclear technology can handle this technology." In this day of diplomacy by media statements a little quiet diplomacy would help resolve a murky situation where nobody is right. I guess as long as everybody is just yelling at each other and not shooting at each other our trip will still happen. Lets hope so.

The last word

There are a lot of words floating around our media that seem to be used indiscriminately without providing any definitions. Words like terrorist, militant, radical Islamic state and moderate Arab state appear everywhere, but I am not always clear who we are talking about. Unless we come up with a truth in labeling law for the media that requires a definition of terms be attached to each article, we may need another vehicle to decipher the information. Looking at examples of what is being described might be helpful. Under that method it appears that a radical Islamic state is a state that is unable to support US policies because it has sufficient democratic institutions that the government needs to be sensitive to the opinions of its citizens. A moderate Arab state seems to be an authoritarian state whose leaders do not have listen to their citizens and therefore can support US policies. This division does, at times seem to create some odd situations. Recently US intelligence officials showed media representatives a sampling of weapons that they claimed were provided by the “radical Islamic state”, Iran, to Iraqi “militants” and “terrorists”. The officials claimed that these weapons had killed 170 American troops since the beginning of the war. When I heard this I wondered where the weapons have come from that killed the other 3000 soldiers. For answers to questions like this it is generally useful to follow the money. In this case I wouldn’t be at all surprised if that road didn’t lead through the “moderate Arab state” of Saudi Arabia. These are the folks that brought us most of the 9/11 highjackers, the mujahadeen in Afghanistan including Osama bin Laden and who export the intolerant, fundamentalist Wahabist version of Islam throughout the world. This situation raises the question: “How do situations like this happen?”. A few years ago I learned in Sunday School that when one is reading the book known to the church as the Gospel of Matthew and one asks the question “Why is this story included?”, the answer is usually Moses. In the case of the Middle East, when one asks the question “Why is this odd behavior happening?”, the answer is usually oil.