The Syrian Dilemma

One question I am frequently asked these days is what is the U.S. policy in Syria and why are we acting differently in Syria than we did in Libya. In considering these questions I am reminded of the words of a Middle East expert who when asked about U.S. Middle East policy responded, “We don't have a policy in the Middle East, but that's just as well because, if we did, it would be the wrong one”. Before discussing Syria, it would be useful to examine the Libyan situation.

The Brotherly Leader of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi was an easy target for international military support for a revolution. In addition to his eccentric antics, he had managed, through his words and policies over the years, to make enemies of nearly everybody, the western powers, fellow Arab leaders (especially in the wealthy, autocratic Gulf States) and his own people. When, following the approval of UN Resolution 1973 authorizing “all necessary actions to protect civilians”, the western powers, interpreting the resolution very liberally, embarked on a policy of regime change, no one came to Qaddafi’s defense. The situation in Syria is quite different.

While Libya was isolated politically, diplomatically and geographically, Syria sits in the middle of the volatile Levant region bordering Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Israel. It is a major player in the so-called axis of resistance along with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Any western intervention in Syria would likely bring its allies into the conflict with serious regional consequences.

The divisions in Libyan society are largely tribal in nature. On the other hand, in Syria, tribal rivalries are overlaid with sectarian divisions. The Christian and Alawite (an offshoot of Shia Islam) minorities are generally part of and supportive of the regime, whereas the majority Sunni Muslims see themselves as oppressed.

Faced with these complicating factors and an overriding concern about the rise of Iran and a possible threat to Israel, the U.S. is attempting to create its own version of the Great Game between Russia and Britain in Central Asia in the 19^th Century. The U.S. is attempting to mobilize and co-opt regional players such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to confront the resistance axis and orchestrate regime change in Syria. This effort, well financed by the wealthy Gulf States, appears to be turning the uprising against the Assad regime into a low grade civil war.

The conservative Gulf monarchies have long despised the secular Assad regime in Syria. Among their Sunni proxies in Syria are a large number of Salafist groups including many jihadist fighters who were kicked out of Iraq and who have set up shop in Syria. Orchestrating a Syria/Iran game as part the effort to remake the New Middle East, utilizing allies with different agendas, is risky business and may come back to haunt the U.S. and its allies.

Technorati Tags: Libya,Syria,Axis of Resistance,Middle East

The U.S.–Iran Standoff

This week the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its much ballyhooed report on Iran’s nuclear program. The release of the report has been accompanied by a great deal of hype and alarmist rhetoric by western governments and media. Upon close inspection, however, the document appears to be “much ado about nothing”. Almost all of the information on Iran’s nuclear weapons program in the report is historical, dating to 2002, and has been known by most observers for some time. In its summary, the IAEA concludes that it “continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement”. The report complains that Iran has failed to live up to its obligations under the Additional Protocol, neglecting to mention that Iran signed, but never ratified this protocol.

The new material on weaponization efforts sites as its source undisclosed intelligence information from Member States, presumably U.S, Israel and other western intelligence agencies. This information primarily alleges that Iran is conducting research on weapons systems that could lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. The report gives no hard evidence supporting this allegation. Even if all of the allegations are true, the report neglects to point out that, as a signatory to the NPT, Iran has obligated itself not to “manufacture or acquire” nuclear weapons {there is no mention of weapons research) and, therefore, is not in violation of the NPT.

There are, however, some useful understandings in this report. First, the IAEA has become much more political under its current head, Yukiya Amano, than it was under his predecessor, Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei. Most of the intelligence information included in this report was available to ElBaradei, but he did not deem it credible enough to include in previous reports. Amano, who owes his position to strong U.S. lobbying, has taken the agency in a new direction and, as described in a State Dept. cable released by Wikileaks, is “solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision”.

The second understanding is that U.S. policies toward the Islamic Republic are a complete failure. Iran continues to develop its nuclear program, albeit more slowly than it might have hoped. The so called crippling sanctions have done nothing to affect Iranian policy. Iran has been able to maintain its oil production at about 4 mm bpd and with a budget based on an oil price of $65 and current prices hovering around $100 they are not in financial straits. They have been able to get around many financial restrictions by taking payments from India and China in local currency and leaving the currency in place to pay for imports. They have also been forced to put their currency reserves in gold. (Not a bad investment.)

The U.S. has finally been forced to back down and to acknowledge that stricter sanctions or military conflict would have very serious negative consequences for the struggling western economies. Now might be a good time to reconsider the policies. Unfortunately, this is not a likely occurrence.

Technorati Tags: Iran. IAEA

America’s Declining Influence

This week Palestine was admitted as a full member of UNESCO, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Despite strong U.S. and Israeli lobbying against the resolution the vote in favor was overwhelmingly positive: 107 for, 14 against and 52 abstentions. It appears that, besides the U.S. and Israel, only 12 states support the Zionist enterprise. As can be seen from this video, the result was enormously popular among conference members and was enthusiastically received despite the potential financial problems that will be created for the organization. The larger implication is for U.S, global influence.

Immediately after the UNESCO result was announced, the U.S. announced that it was withholding its payment of its $80mm contribution to UNESCO which amounts to 22% of the agency’s budget. Should the U.S. continue in arrears for two years, it will lose its voting membership and join such luminaries as Somalia and Libya in being in arrears on its UNESCO dues. While the funding deficit is serious, it could easily be made up by countries such as Russia, China or Saudi Arabia who voted yes and for whom $80mm is pocket change. A similar outcome can be expected if Palestine continues to take its statehood case to other UN agencies such as IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), WHO (World Health Organization) and 12 other agencies who have similar rules. This will have important implications for U.S. national interest in issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and global health among others.

This is only the latest in a series of events which have highlighted U.S. declining influence in the Middle East. When the U.S demanded that Israel halt construction of settlements in occupied Palestine, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was completely comfortable in ignoring the wishes of his strongest ally and continuing construction. Despite U.S. threats to cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority and to veto the statehood resolution at the UN, President Abbas ignored the U.S. threats and proceeded to the UN Security Council.

The decline in U.S. influence in the region and the concurrent rise in Iranian influence began with the U.S invasion of Iraq. This has had significant consequences for U.S. regional policy. In Iraq, Iran’s political allies have been able to prevent the U.S. from retaining a significant military force on the ground. In Bahrain, the U.S. has had to back away from its support of the democracy movements for fear of Iranian influence among Bahrain’s Shia majority. When I recently asked a senior State Department official about this, his reply was, “This is an extremely difficult problem”.

Absent a significant change in policy approach, it is likely that America’s influence with friend and foe alike will continue to decline. The decline will have major implications for America’s foreign policy objectives. Other countries will certainly fill the vacuum. Whether this will be positive or negative remains to be seen.

That said this quote from Amb. Charles Freeman at the recent NCUSAR (National Council on U.S. Arab Relations) Conference is applicable, “I want to close by affirming my faith in the adaptability and resilience of the United States.  With all the problems we have made for ourselves and our friends in the Middle East, we have just about run out of alternatives to doing the right things.  Now we may get around to actually doing them.”