What can Bibi be thinking?

Secretary of State John Kerry, continuing his extraordinary efforts to craft a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, efforts that have included shuttle diplomacy and arm twisting, appears to be on the verge of issuing the “Kerry Parameters”, a final status framework to guide future negotiations. Critics and pundits have said that this is just more of the same failed policy. This time may be different. For one thing, this will be the first American proposal designed to resolve the conflict since the “Clinton Parameters” in 2000. While no one except the insiders knows the exact content of the proposal, leaks and informed speculation leads me to believe that Kerry’s document will contain the following:

· Two states based on the 1967 borders with negotiated land swaps

· Jerusalem as a shared capital

· Israel to retain the major settlement blocks

· The Palestinian state to be demilitarized

· Israel to have a security force in the Jordan River valley for an extended period of time

· Israel to be recognized as a Jewish state

· No return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland

As with all the previous efforts to resolve the Israel/Palestine situation the devil is in the details. It appears that the Kerry Parameters will largely be based on the Clinton Parameters. In the land swaps, the Israelis will get land near the major population centers and the Palestinians will get an equivalent amount of desert. The Palestinian capital in Jerusalem will probably be a building somewhere near Jerusalem. The presence of the Israeli security force in the Jordan Valley will be vaguely worded in a way that it will likely become permanent. In short, Israel will get everything that it has declared that it needs in a two-state solution.

The political stars also seem to be aligned to make this time different. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, with no effective opposition, having assembled a stable governing coalition, is in a strong political position. On the other hand, the Palestinians, riven by divisions between Fatah and Hamas, represented by a corrupt, incompetent, illegitimate Palestinian Authority, having an economy solely dependent on Israeli inputs and foreign aid, as if preparing themselves to fade into a desert sandstorm, are in no position to negotiate from strength. The regional Arab states, long supportive of the Palestinian cause, are engulfed in chaos or, as is the case of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, just want to see the problem go away so that they can focus their attention on Iran, their number one enemy. Iran, a longtime supporter of the Palestinian cause, may be willing to give up the fight in order to retain its nuclear program while getting sanctions relief.

Having received everything that he wanted, why then is Bibi still pushing back against the plan? The answer may lie in the old cliché, “be careful what you wish for, you might just get it”. In the twenty plus years of the Oslo Peace Process, Israel, while expanding its footprint on the West Bank, has been able to make the security argument that a Palestinian state is an existential threat in order to frustrate the two-state solution. Faced with the Law of Return, allowing any Jew moving to Israel to obtain citizenship, Israel, with no defined borders, has been able to use the West Bank settlements to accommodate this burgeoning Jewish population. Fixed borders which do not include all of the West Bank will not only exacerbate the problem, but also anger the religious Jews who, seeing Judea and Samaria as a gift from God, wish to establish “Eretz Israel” from the Mediterranean to the Jordan.

The fixed borders of this plan allow Israel to get rid of most, but not all, of its Arab population. With the so-called Palestinian state in place, the attention of internal, as well as international, activists will now be focused on the second class status of Israel’s 1.5mm Arab citizens. Feeling that the two-state solution would never happen, successive Israeli governments have done almost nothing to prepare for this eventuality. It seems that Netanyahu’s strategy depends on finding a way to torpedo the proposal and having the Palestinians be blamed for it.

A Dose of Reality Arrives in Syria

As the Syrian civil war drags on into its third year, it appears that the players, internal and external, in this long running tragedy may be starting to exhibit some common sense. With over 130,000 people killed to date on all sides, millions of people displaced internally and externally and the conflict gradually spreading into neighboring countries, leaders of the involved parties seem to be moving toward taking steps to resolve the crisis.

From the beginning of the conflict in March 2011, U.S. policies have been guided by geopolitical considerations involving Iran and Hezbollah rather than humanitarian concerns. Since Iran relies on Hezbollah to act as an asymmetric deterrent force against Israel and Hezbollah relies on Iran for financial and military support, if the conduit through Syria were cut off by the fall of Assad, both parties would be weaker. Israel, therefore, would be less deterred from attacking Hezbollah and Iran. Early on many U.S. politicians, led by Senator John McCain, advocated for the U.S intervention in support of the rebels. The Friends of Syria made up of 114 nations was formed by the U.S. and its allies and met numerous times in 2012-13 for the purpose of organizing military and other aid to the rebel organizations. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States sent millions of dollars to jihadist rebel groups. President Obama confidently stated that “Assad must step aside” (See here) and told Iraqi President Maliki that “Assad will fall in two months”. (See here)

As the situation on the ground in Syria began to deteriorate in 2013, the external actors began to have second thoughts. The al Qaeda linked Islamist rebel groups usurped the more secular Syrian National Council and became the dominant rebel force. Western powers became concerned that that their citizens fighting with radical Islamist groups would return home and bring the war to the home front. (According to intelligence sources, there are over 50 U.S. citizens currently fighting with jihadists in Syria) The pro-Assad forces have regained territory from the rebels and Iran, Russia and Hezbollah have been steadfast in their support for the Assad regime. The first Friends of Syria conference attracted 114 nations; the last conference attracted 14. The outside actors, with no good outcome in sight have begun to search for a plan B.

While some of the suggestions for a plan B, such as reaching out to the al Qaeda linked al Nusra Front, are absurd, (See here) others being implemented and considered make sense. The U.S. and Russia organized a Geneva II conference which included all sides of the conflict. While the U.S., unable to get over its animosity toward Iran, refused to allow Iran to attend, Secretary John Kerry reached out to Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif at the Munch Security Conference. Unsurprisingly Zarif rebuffed his advance. Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri has disowned the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), seeing them as too radical. (Now that’s a statement.) (See here) In what is perhaps the most important development, Saudi Arabia, under pressure from the U.S., has announced that it is abandoning its fighters in Syria and Iraq. (See here) Without Saudi support, it will be very difficult to sustain the jihadist armies.

Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul has proposed cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia on the Syria issue. Since these three are the main regional supporters of the protagonists, if the three can reach an agreement, a lot of pressure can be brought to bear to end the conflict.

Can the U.S. Deal With a Middle East Earthquake?

Over the last month the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has been jolted and fractured by the earthquake of the EU3+3 nuclear agreement with Iran and the numerous aftershocks that have followed. The players who are wedded to the status quo are struggling to navigate this new landscape. Western and regional diplomats have been jetting around the region in an effort to figure out how to deal with the changes. This turmoil within traditional alliances has come at an inconvenient time for the Obama administration as it struggles to implement its announced pivot or rebalancing to the Pacific. As National Security Advisor Susan Rice told the NY Times in October, “We can’t just be consumed 24/7 by one region, important as it is.”

Ever since Richard Nixon was forced to “pivot to the Pacific” by the Vietnam War, the U.S. has, at various times, relied on strong regional allies to protect its interests around the globe. Initially in the Middle East, the allies were Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the U.S. relied on Israel, Saudi Arabia and at times Egypt. Under George W. Bush this “twin pillars” strategy was abandoned for a policy of direct unilateral intervention to protect U.S. interests. Now, just when Obama would like to again rely on regional allies, the whole alliance structure is shifting and breaking down.

The Egyptian Revolution has taken Egypt completely out of the picture. Saudi Arabia’s divided and dysfunctional foreign policy team has been sorely tested by its desire to maintain relations with the U.S. while at the same time supporting sectarian conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Its vehement anti-Iran position and its leadership within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are being challenged by Iran’s diplomatic blitz. Iran was invited to the Manama Dialogue, a security conference in Bahrain, a Saudi client state. Ignoring Saudi objections, the GCC has responded positively to Iranian overtures to improve relations among Persian Gulf littoral states. GCC member Oman, a valuable U.S. intermediary with Iran, has rejected unequivocally a Saudi effort to unite the GCC as a single entity under Saudi leadership. Lebanon has rebuffed Saudi suggestions that the Lebanese Army turn its guns on Iran’s ally Hezbollah. The possibility of Iran dramatically increasing its oil production threatens the Saudi role as the swing producer in OPEC. Faced with the declining power of a key ally, the U.S. has relied on its default response of selling the Saudis billions of dollars of high tech weaponry.

America’s other pillar in the region, Israel, has its own struggles. The death of anti-apartheid hero, Nelson Mandala, came at a particularly bad time for Israel as it focused attention on Israel’s treatment of its non-Jewish population and resulted in growing international criticism Even the vaunted lobbying power of AIPAC is being called into question by its failure to prevent the Geneva Nuclear Agreement with Iran and, thus far, its inability to torpedo the Geneva agreement with new Congressional sanctions. As Obama’s threat to veto new Iran sanctions shows, Israel’s intransigence with respect to settlements seems to be wearing out its welcome at the White House. While the frustration with Israeli political pressure hasn’t reached the level of George Bush ’41 when his Secretary of State James Baker infamously said “F**k the Jews, they don’t vote for us anyway”, the frustration is certainly increasing. With a second term President, who isn’t facing an election, Israel has a problem.

While Saudi Arabia and Israel are discussing an alliance to counter Iranian influence, it appears to be a marriage of convenience. As the U.S. attempts to back away from direct commitments in Syria and Afghanistan, it will leave a power vacuum. It is not clear who will be able to fill this vacuum. Russia and China have ambitions in the region, but they have neither the will nor the way fill the U.S. role. As Beirut based Alistair Crooke said his recent post on Conflicts Forum, “Winding-down the US commitment in the region does not mean that all the area’s problems will be solved, but it does imply that the US will no longer be expected to resolve them all. “

Technorati Tags: AIPAC,Iran Nuclear Program,Middle East,Saydi Arabia,U.S. Foreign Policy

Obstacles to an Agreement with Iran

In order to understand the political dynamics surrounding the recently signed EU + 3/Iran nuclear agreement, it is important to understand some of the history. The U.S, sanctions regime against Iran began in 1979 shortly after the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. The initial sanctions were imposed by President Jimmy Carter who froze millions of dollars of Iranian assets in U.S. banks. In the 1980’s, the sanctions were expanded to include weapons and any financial aid to Iran, as the U.S. attempted to aid Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The sanctions regime was expanded in 1987 under President Ronald Reagan and again in 1997 under President Bill Clinton. President Obama has magnified the impact of the sanctions by threatening and coercing governments around the world, wishing to do business in the U.S., to abide by the unilateral American sanctions. These sanctions have had an increasingly negative impact on the Iranian economy and on the lives of ordinary Iranians. Circumventing and mitigating the effects of the sanctions has been a major focus of almost all Iranian governments.
The Iranian nuclear program dates back to 1957 when the U.S. signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s government under the Atoms for Peace Program. Following the revolution, the Siemens AG contract to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor was terminated. Shortly thereafter the Iranian government announced an ambitious program to construct its own reactor and to master the nuclear fuel cycle. In my opinion, while the nuclear program has been expanded to provide nuclear power and medical isotopes, its primary purpose has been to accumulate bargaining chips in order get the sanctions removed and reduced and to get Iran reintegrated into the international community. As the West has rebuffed all Iranian efforts at reintegration, the chips have continued to accumulate. It is not a nuclear weapon that concerns the U.S. and its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, but the reintegration of Iran into the global economy.
Iran is strategically located astride the Straits of Hormuz and is a buffer state between the Middle East and Central Asia. With its large (70mm), well-educated young population, relatively stable governance, and substantial potential for oil and gas production, Iran is much better positioned than its neighbors to project political and economic power, both within the region and globally. It is this potential to change the status quo in the region that most worries Iran’s adversaries. The nuclear weapons issue is a politically powerful red herring to cover the true concerns.
During the Geneva talks, Israel and Saudi Arabia spent much money, printers ink and bombast to prevent the interim agreement from being signed. Having failed in that effort, they are now rolling out the political big guns in Washington in order shoot down any final comprehensive deal that will result in rapprochement with Iran. Already the Obama administration is showing signs of backing away from any final status agreement. (See here and here.) While it is in America’s interest to resolve the conflict with Iran diplomatically, it is unclear to me whether or not Obama, who sees every foreign policy issue through a lens of domestic politics, will be able to summon the political will to deliver on the promise of the Geneva agreement.

Believe the Mullahs?

Ever since the EU3+3 and Iran announced their agreement on “Joint Plan of Action” with respect to Iran’s nuclear program and western sanctions on Iran, “the spin masters” on all sides have been busy framing the agreement in ways that match their political agendas. The U.S. media has given the most airtime and press space to those who are opposed to the agreement and who are determined to torpedo it. Most of the opponents have echoed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s pronouncement that the agreement is a “historic mistake”. Most of the pundits appear to have reached their conclusions without having read the document. Netanyahu certainly didn’t read the agreement as he made his statements days before the agreement was finalized. The Obama administration felt the need to fight back against their opponents by issuing a Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program. (As far as I can see they have neglected to publish the full text of the agreement) The Iranian government promptly rejected the Fact Sheet saying, “What has been released by the website of the White House as a fact sheet is a one-sided interpretation of the agreed text in Geneva and some of the explanations and words in the sheet contradict the text of the Joint Plan of Action…”. (See here) Iran promptly released the full text of the agreement. (See here) The Iranians also disputed Secretary of State John Kerry’s statement that “"We do not recognize a right to enrich".

With all this back and forth, I thought that it might be useful to actually look at the agreement. First, one should point out that this is an interim agreement designed to provide an opportunity to build trust between the parties and to deescalate the dispute while a final agreement is negotiated. That said the agreement does provide the “Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution.” None of the steps agreed upon for the interim period are irreversible for either side and nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.

With respect to the nuclear program, among other things, the agreement provides that Iran will:

• From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.

• Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

• Iran has decided to convert to oxide, UF6 (Uranium Hexafluoride) newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

With respect to the right to enrich, the agreement states, “This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program.” This sounds to me like recognition of the right to enrich with IAEA inspection.

With respect to sanctions the agreement says, “This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.” The U.S. piece was weasel worded in recognition of Congress’s ability to throw a monkey wrench in the agreement. Iran’s agreement on the Additional Protocol of the NPT was also weasel worded in recognition of the Iranian Parliament’s ability to refuse to ratify it as they refused to do in 2003.

Despite all the controversy, the Geneva Agreement appears to me to be a balanced effort which achieves its goal of buying time for a reasonable and comprehensive solution to the 35 year war between the U.S. and Iran. It is too bad, however, that in order to get the facts, one must rely on the mullahs rather than the U.S. Dept. of State. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani seems to treat his people like adults and explain exactly what he agreed to and what he didn’t. It would be nice if the U.S. government would do the same for us.

Photo by LA Times

Technorati Tags: Iran Nuclear Program,Iran,Geneva Agreement

The State of Play in Syria

Since the diplomatic agreement, orchestrated by Russia, to destroy the Syrian chemical stockpiles has moved forward, the bloody civil war in Syria has receded from the front pages of western media. Despite this lack of media coverage, the war and the killing have proceeded apace. With the hysteria surrounding chemical weapons gone, now might be a good time to examine the state of affairs in this unfortunate country.

Observers on the ground in Syria are reporting a dramatic change in the capability of the Syrian armed forces. When Hezbollah and the Iranian al Quds forces arrived on the scene a year or so ago, they were appalled at the state of the Syrian Army. They found a Syrian Army that was poorly led, undisciplined and more designed to repress the ordinary Syrian citizens than to fight an organized, well-armed rebel force. Today the army is well led and motivated and has made significant progress toward recovering territory lost to the rebels in the early days of the rebellion.

While some of their supply lines from Jordan and Lebanon have been cut by the Syrian Army, the rebel armies are being resupplied through Turkey with arms, ammunition and reinforcements by Saudi Arabia and its western allies. The reinforcements consist of Sunni jihadists recruited around the globe including in the U.S. and the U.K. Many of these militants have been trained in Jordanian training camps financed by Saudi Arabia. The fact that there have been mergers and alliances between opposition groups reflects, not unity, but division into competing camps with some of them allied with al Qaeda. The al Qaeda connection, combined with the fact that some of the fighters are British and American citizens with the ability to travel to and from their native countries. is worrisome to policy makers.

With this worry in mind, international politics is moving more in the direction of the Assad regime. Western powers are beginning to see Assad as the lesser of two evils. European countries are exploring the possibility of reopening ties to the Syrian government. Since Russia saved President Obama from himself by negotiating a diplomatic solution to the chemical weapons issue and taken military action off the table, the U.S. has gone from a policy of “regime change” to “no policy”. The U.S. appears to have outsourced its Syrian policy to Russia. Sergei Lavrov and Vladimir Putin are taking the lead in the thankless job of resolving the Syrian mess.

With territory moving back forth between the rebel forces and the Syrian Army, Damascus being relatively normal, except for the occasional terrorist attack and the divisions within the rebel groups, the situation appears to be in stalemate. Civil wars generally end in one of three ways. One side wins and the war is over. There is a negotiated agreement to allow power or territory sharing. The war goes on until everybody is tired of the bloodshed and the fighting stops. With the outside interventions, the possibility of one side winning appears remote. With the divisions within the rebel forces the idea of a successful peace conference is unlikely. The killing will probably go one for a long time, until both sides are exhausted.

Technorati Tags: Syria,Middle East

Close But No Cigar

Last week, after three days of intense negotiations between the EU3+3 and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the participants announced that they had failed to reach an agreement and departed Geneva saying that negotiations would reconvene on November 20 at a lower level. Throughout the negotiation process there had been much optimism and speculation that an agreement was possible. Speculation reached a fever pitch when senior diplomats from most of the participating countries flew to Geneva in order to join in the negotiations. (This is usually a sign that a photo op is imminent.) While exact reason for the collapse of the negotiating process is unclear as of this writing, it appears that we have shifted from a negotiating mode to a blame game mode.

Most of the day on Saturday was spent, not on negotiations with the Iranians, but on negotiations within the EU3+3, trying to iron out their internal disagreements. Contemporaneous reports and leaks by diplomats and reporters on the scene in Geneva stated that France was responsible for the lack of agreement. France was insisting that the interim agreement be rewritten in order to include a Iranian commitment to stop construction of the Arak heavy water reactor. The reason for taking this position is mystifying. While a heavy water reactor is a proliferation concern, as it produces weapons grade plutonium, the Arak facility is over a year away from being completed and another year away from making enough plutonium to produce a weapon. The proposed agreement is a six month reversible interim agreement. This week Secretary of State Kerry, concerned that France was being blamed, announced that Iran was to blame for the failure when it backed away from language concerning their right to enrichment. It sounds to me like revisionist diplomacy and amateur hour at the State Department.

In order to understand why assessing blame is politically important, it is helpful to look at the history. In 2004, under President Khatami, Iran offered to cap its centrifuges at 3000 and it had very little low enriched uranium. This offer was rejected by the U.S. By 2009 Iran had over 7000 centrifuges and 1000 kg of low enriched uranium. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad agreed to ship the low enriched uranium out of the country and have it reprocessed into fuel for the Tehran medical reactor. However, faced with political turmoil following the disputed election, Iran reneged. This deal was revived by Turkey and Brazil in 2010 and this time it was rejected by the U.S. Today Iran has almost 20,000 centrifuges and more than 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium and hundreds of kg of 20% enriched uranium. During this period, the U.S. has implemented a series of draconian economic sanctions on Iran and bullied other countries into going along. The sanctions have dramatically affected the lives of ordinary Iranians and have had no effect on Iran’s nuclear program.

If the U.S. and its allies are seen as not serious about a diplomatic solution, the countries that are cooperating on sanctions may begin to take a different stance. This is especially true if Congress continues to take a “war hawk” position and doubles down on sanctions. If the sanctions regime falls apart, the U.S. has no viable option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program other than military action. The current round of diplomacy is possibly the last, best chance for a diplomatic solution. Unfortunately, Ambassador John Limbert’s fifth rule of U.S. – Iranian relations is still in effect. “Whenever you seem to be making progress, someone or some diabolical coincidence will mess it up”.

(Photo by Yahoo! News)

Technorati Tags: Iran,Iran Nuclear Program,John Kerry

America East of Suez

Last week President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, unveiled, what the media is calling “a more modest strategy for the Mideast”. (See here) Ms. Rice said that the administration would focus its efforts on negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran, brokering a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and mitigating the strife in Syria. The strategy also acknowledged that there are limits to what the U.S. can accomplish in nurturing democracy in the region. While I might argue with some of the specifics, the new strategy appears to be an effort to rectify some of the problems that have plagued U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades.

As U.S. involvement in the Middle East has deepened since the end of WW II, U.S. efforts to project power in the region have clashed with the desire of Middle Easterners for self-determination and political independence. The U.S. has also failed to identify its vital national interests and to focus its policies and power on addressing those interests. This lack of focus has led to policies and objectives that are not only conflicting, but in many cases mutually exclusive. These policy disconnects have led to a failure to accomplish foreign policy objectives. Those it has accomplished have been more in spite of rather than because of the policies.

My definition of a “vital national interest” is one that deals with an existential threat to the U.S. and one for which the U.S. is willing to spill its blood and to spend its treasure in order to accomplish its objectives. By this definition, the U.S. has no vital national interest in events in the Middle East. Since WW II access to the energy resources of the Middle East at a reasonable price has been a vital national interest. With the advent of “fracking” and shale, the U.S. is on the verge of becoming a net energy exporter and this has fundamentally changed energy geopolitics. U.S. interests are now more associated with non-proliferation of WMD and controlling and defeating the Sunni jihadist threat. While U.S. blind support for Israel will remain a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it attempts to deal with Middle Easterners, the larger Israel/Palestinian conflict, with the death of the two state solution, has morphed into an internal Israeli problem. The Israelis themselves will have to decide what kind of a country they want to be.

The Obama administration seems to have realized that, in order to successfully deal with the jihadist and WMD issues, they will need to deal with Iran. Iranian cooperation is crucial for the attainment of U.S. policy objectives. Success in dealing with Iran will require taking into account Iran’s requirement for sovereignty over its energy policy and autonomy in designing and implementing its foreign policy. Saudi Arabia has become marginalized on the energy issue and on the jihadist issue. It is part of the problem and not part of the solution. Saudi realization that the U.S. may be looking after its own national interest rather than following the lead of the most undemocratic regimes in the region has led to what only can be described as a “temper tantrum”. Turning down a seat on the UN Security Council (See here) to send a message to the U.S. may be the ultimate tantrum.

The U.S. may be experiencing its own “East of Suez” moment as it accepts that it has diminished influence in the global arena. (See here) This transition will be difficult for Americans to accept, particularly the empire-building neo-cons, but at the end of the day both America and the Middle East may be better for it.

 

Technorati Tags: Iran,U.S. Foreign Policy,Iran Nuclear Program,Middle East

Waiting for the Messiah

Since Secretary of State John Kerry kicked off the latest round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority designed to reach a two state solution to the Israel/Palestine situation, we have heard next to nothing about what is happening. This could be either good news or bad news. It is possible (although unlikely) that progress is being made behind the scene in substantive negotiations that are best done out of the media spotlight. A more likely scenario is that nothing is happening and all sides are concerned about the potential for unrest that would accompany the final demise of the two state solution.

Politicians on all sides have been declaring that “the window for a two state solution will close within a year” for the last 15 years. This dire prediction has become as common as Israel’s 20 year prediction that, absent a military attack, Iran will have a nuclear weapon within 6 months. While an Iranian nuclear weapon would constitute a serious threat to Israel, the Reut Institute, an Israeli think tank that advises Israeli leaders on strategic issues, has concluded that the biggest treat to Israeli national security is “one man one vote”. In a recent report Reut stated, “Annexation of the Palestinian people into Israel would compromise Israel’s Jewish majority, while continued control of the Palestinian population may jeopardize Israel’s democracy and long-term legitimacy” (See here) This warning has been resisted by most Israelis, since they find the status quo of occupation and separation to be completely sustainable.

Seven years ago, when I first wrote about a single state solution, I felt the need to label my posts “A Completely Absurd Idea”. {See here, here, and here) Today the one bi-national state can now be discussed in polite company. Young people in Palestine have completely gone to one state-ism. At a Sabeel conference last week, I heard a Palestinian leader describe his conversations with his young daughters. One daughter is a second year chemical engineering major at M.I.T. and the other is a sophomore at the Ramallah Friends School. They said, “Dad, 1948 was like a hundred 9/11’s and you and grandpa reacted like anyone would. First you tried fighting (we’re not very good fighters), then you tried non-violent resistance, then you tried negotiating and then you tried going to the UN. Dad, nothing worked. We are still occupied. Why don’t we just say to the Israelis, OK you win. You get it all. The land, the water, the oil and gas in Gaza and, by the way, you also get us. I understand that you have free healthcare. Where do I pick up my card? I would also like your free education. And where do I go to vote?”

The reality is that we already have a single state. The only question is what kind of a state it will be. Will it be an apartheid state under occupation, an ethnically cleansed Jewish state or a bi-national state with equal rights for all? Waiting for two states is like the Jewish view of waiting for the Messiah. He may come someday, but I am not holding my breath.

Technorati Tags: Israel,Palestine,Peace Process

This Week in Iran

This week’s opening of the U.N. General Assembly was not its normal boring gabfest, but a fascinating and fast moving diplomatic event. The presence of newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who arrived with a clear agenda to move the ball forward in normalizing Iranian relations with the West, made for fascinating diplomatic drama which culminated in President Obama’s phone conversation with Rouhani.

Not only were Rouhani’s diplomatic and political skills on display, but they were accompanied by a sophisticated, adept and agile Iranian public relations campaign. (Who’d have thunk it?) The blizzard of tweets, press releases and op-ed pieces orchestrated by the Iranians was amazing to watch. Gary Sick, an Iran expert with Columbia University commented, “They’re putting stuff out faster than the naysayers can keep up. They dominate the airwaves”. Even the vaunted Israeli “hasbara” public relations machine has been caught flat footed. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has come off sounding like a grumpy old warmonger. The neo-con, and normally bellicose pundits, such as Bill Kristol, John Bolton and Charles Krauthammer have struggled to find their voice.

Even the main stream media has struggled with how to react. The most egregious example came from NBC’s Brian Williams who stated, “This is all part of a new leadership effort by Iran - suddenly claiming they don't want nuclear weapons; what they want is talks and transparency and good will. And while that would be enough to define a whole new era, skepticism is high and there's a good reason for it." This statement that this is “sudden” is patently untrue. What is seen as sudden by Williams has been the Iranian position for over a decade. When President Khatami proposed a “grand bargain” in 2003, he faced the George W. Bush administration who, as Ambassador Ryan Crocker told me, “didn’t think that it was real”. When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed something similar, Obama was faced with an Iranian President whose bellicose rhetoric on Israel and the Holocaust were too politically toxic to deal with.

Now, however, we have the happy convergence of leaders whose default position is diplomacy, increasingly shared interests and a rapidly changing political environment in the Middle East. The two predominant naysayers, Israel and Saudi Arabia, have about worn out their welcome with Obama. Israel by torpedoing every effort to resolve the Palestinian situation and Saudi Arabia by underwriting al Qaeda affiliated groups throughout the region.

The Western media has portrayed Iranian ability to make the necessary concessions as the biggest obstacle. In fact, the ability of the U.S. to deal with sanctions relief is a much bigger obstacle. Iran is not going to agree to any deal that does not, at least in some measure, provide for sanctions relief. The Iran sanctions are written into U. S, law. While the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 gives the President some limited waiver authority, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 has no such provision. Given the fact that Congressional Republicans are in no mood to give Obama a political and diplomatic victory and the spectacle of zero concern for the country’s best interests that we are now witnessing, any action is unlikely. We may, once again, miss a golden opportunity to resolve this problem peacefully. The first rule of U.S./Iranian relations, “Never walk through an open door. Instead beat your head against the wall” still applies.

Technorati Tags: Barack Obama,Iran,Iran Nuclear Program

The Landscape Changes Again

The rise of the Arab Awakening which began with so much promise and its subsequent decent into chaos has drastically changed the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and North Africa. Libya and Tunisia are mired in political turmoil. Egypt is tittering on the brink of civil conflict. Syria is deeply engaged in a full scale civil war with no end in sight. Yemen’s civil unrest is not yet a civil war, but with its separationist history, civil conflict is certainly possible. Iraq is experiencing as much sectarian violence as during the dark days of the “surge”. Lebanon is threatened by collapse as outside forces play out their geopolitical goals. Only Hezbollah’s balancing efforts and refusal to play the sectarian card, are keeping Lebanon stable. Jordan is trying desperately to avoid spillover from its unstable neighbors.

In all these countries that experienced transition from decades long authoritarian rule to some form of democracy, neither the leaders nor the international community realized that the people didn’t necessarily want democracy. What they wanted was a better life and to be treated better by their government. None of the leaders that succeeded the authoritarian rules, whether they were Islamist or secular, had any vision about how to move their countries ahead.

The result of all this is that the region has become a playground for jihadists who hold an al Qaeda like worldview. Trained in Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi tradition, they have arrived from around the world, including Europe and the U.S., in order to fight for their vision of an Islamic caliphate. While the bulk of the Arab world does not want to be ruled by jihadists and other hardline Islamists, the hardliners are slowly gaining the upper hand. Their success in the region as well as the threat that they pose when they bring their worldview and fighting skills back to their countries of origin, makes these Sunni jihadists the biggest national security threat to the U.S. and other western countries.

This threat has drastically changed the geopolitical calculus in the region. The biggest threat to Israel is no longer attack by its Arab neighbors, who have bigger problems of their own and have largely lost interest in the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue is now an internal Israeli problem. Having established their rule over all of historical Palestine, they now have the problem of how to deal with a minority population ruling over the majority, in many cases brutally. History has shown that this is not a recipe for stability.

As the Sunni jihadists have become the major security threat, Saudi Arabia’s support and funding of these characters has made Saudi Arabia part of the problem and not part of the solution. Can the U.S. maintain its close relationship with Saudi Arabia while trying to deal with the mounting jihadist treat?

The Sunni jihadist threat also has implications for U.S. and western relations with Iran. Iran, a predominately Shia country, has the same concerns about the Sunni jihadists as do the western countries. This makes Iran a natural ally in combating this threat. Combine this fact with the charm offensive initiated by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and we may have an opening for rapprochement between Iran and the west. Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be happy, but occasionally western countries have acted in their own national interest. Openings have been there before and have been rebuffed. This time may be different.

Technorati Tags: Iran,Middle East

Questions and Answers on Syria

 

When the Obama administration began its march toward war with Syria last month, there were numerous questions that were begging for answers. During the weeks of debate, posturing and political maneuvering that have followed, some answers have become more clear and some remain obscured. The initial question for me was what is the evidence that the chemical attack in the suburbs of Damascus was perpetrated by the Assad government? Secretary of State John Kerry has tried to make the case that the links to Assad are undeniable, but no evidence has been produced to substantiate this claim. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of the carefully worded unclassified Intelligence Estimate often cited in support of the war, which seems more designed to obscure the facts than to elucidate them. (See here) We are being asked to accept the administration’s judgment on faith. After the Iraq fiasco, this is hard for me. Acceptance is especially difficult since administration officials have told media outlets that the evidence is not a “slam dunk”. (See here)

A second question is what are the strategic outcomes that the administration intends to achieve? This question has had many answers depending on who is answering, when and to whom they are speaking. The answers cover a broad ground; limited strikes to punish the regime, targeted strikes to degrade the regime’s capabilities, strikes intended to shift the military balance and bring the parties to the negotiating table, regime change, send a message to Iran, weaken Iran and Hezbollah in order to protect Israel, uphold U.S. credibility (whatever that means) and prevent a political defeat for Obama. The list grows longer by the day. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in a rare moment of candor, when asked by Senator Bob Corker about the administration’s strategic objectives, Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey replied “I can’t answer that question”.

The answer to the question, how has the U.S. prepared to deal with the unintended consequences of war with Syria, is even less clear. These consequences are numerous. Al Akbar reports, “Informed insiders have confirmed that Syria and Hezbollah plan to retaliate against Israel in the event of an American-led military attack on Syria. Says one, ‘If even one US missile hits Syria, we will take this battle to Israel’.” (See here) If the attacks turn the tide of the civil war will Iran intervene to aid Assad? If the rebels carry the day and begin a raft of revenge killings, how will the U.S respond? Russia has moved warships to the eastern Mediterranean. How will they respond? U.S. intelligence has claimed that, in the event of an attack, Iran has instructed its allies in Iraq and Lebanon to strike at U.S. targets. If the Assad regime loses control of chemical and biological weapons to the al Qaeda linked rebels, how will the U.S. respond? There is no mood in Russia, China or Iran to give the U.S. an easy win. It is instructive of the administration position, that, again in a rare moment of candor, Secretary of State John Kerry responding to a question about the usefulness of a ban on the use of ground troops in the Senate war resolution, said "I don't want to take off the table an option that might or might not be available to a president of the United States to secure our country”.

As former British intelligence officer Alistair Crooke points out in his always insightful commentary, “The precise consequences from lobbing cruise missiles can never be foreseen, and although always, before the event, such interventions are assumed to be quick and painless, it seldom turns out that way in practice”.

Photo by White House

Technorati Tags: Syria,Obama,Middle East

Who Benefits?

As the U.S. and its allies move on what appears to be an inevitable march toward war in Syria, it seems that it might be useful to examine what Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the known knowns, the known unknowns and unknown unknowns. After all the blustery rhetoric from the western powers over the last days, it appears unlikely that they can now back away from war without politically “appearing weak”.

As I write this, it seems that the known knowns are that a horrific chemical attack occurred outside of Damascus last week which resulted in the deaths of many people including women and children. Among the many known unknowns are who in fact initiated this attack and what they expected to gain from it. Phyllis Bennis writes a cogent analysis of this issue on commondreams.org (the whole post is here) which I excerpt below.

“But who benefits is a little more complicated.

It’s certainly not impossible that the Syrian regime, known to have had a chemical weapons arsenal, used such a weapon. If so, why? Despite remaining under pressure from sanctions and facing increasing international isolation, Damascus has been seeing some success on the battlefield. It’s certainly possible a mid-level Syrian officer, worried about some past defeat and desperately afraid of being held accountable for it, might have chosen to use such a weapon to gain a gruesome battlefield victory despite the increase in the threat of direct military intervention. But it is very unlikely the regime’s leadership would have made such a choice. Not because they “wouldn’t kill their own people,” they’ve been doing just that. But because they stood to lose far more than any potential gain. It’s not impossible. But as brutal as this regime is, it isn’t crazy. It’s unlikely.

Then there’s the other side, the diverse opposition whose strongest fighters are those claiming allegiance to al Qaeda and similar extremist organizations. Those who benefit from this attack, are those eager for greater US and western military intervention against the Assad regime in Damascus. Further, al Qaeda and its offshoots have always been eager to get the US military—troops, warplanes, ships, bases, whatever—into their territory. It makes it so much easier to attack them there. Politically it remains what US counter-intelligence agents long ago called a “recruitment tool” for al Qaeda. They loved the Iraq war for that reason. They would love the Syrian war all the more if US targets were brought in. All the debate about “red lines,” the domestic and international political pressure to “do something,” the threats to the UN inspectors on the ground—who inside Syria do we think is cheering that on?

(And as for the opposition’s capacity and/or willingness to use such weapons…we should also remember that the opposition includes some defectors. Who knows what skills and weapons access they brought with them? And do we really doubt that al Qaeda wanna-be extremists, many of them not even Syrians, would hesitate to kill civilians in a suburb of Damascus?)”

The unknown unknowns are what the consequences of a military strike will be. No war plan survives the first contact with the enemy. As I drove home today, I saw a sign saying “War used to be the name of a card game”. Oh for those simpler days.

 

Technorati Tags: Syria,Chemical weapons

The Death of Sykes-Picot

Following WW I (the “war to end all wars”) British Diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot negotiated the now infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was intended to divide up the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence. The resulting hodgepodge of artificial entities controlled by London and Paris was a recipe for conflict from the start. The borders and installed governments largely ignored tribal, ethnic, sectarian and geographic realities in establishing the entities. As David Fromkin points out in his seminal book “A Peace to End All Peace”, “It (the agreement) showed that Sir Mark Sykes and his colleagues had adopted policies for the Middle East without first considering whether, in existing conditions, they could feasibly be implemented…and suggested the extent to which the British government did not know what it was getting into when it decided to supersede the Ottoman Empire in Asia…” Now, after almost 100 years of ongoing turmoil, we are witnessing the violent collapse of the ill-conceived political structure in the region.

Of the entities that remained after Sykes – Picot, only Egypt and Iran had any semblance of the characteristics of a nation-state. While Iran is home to numerous ethnic groups, it is united by its overwhelming Shia Muslim character. As the recent Iranian election of Hassan Rowhani with high voter turnout demonstrates, Iran’s system of integrating Islamic governance and participatory politics continues to have the support of most Iranians living in the country. Iran is emerging as a more confident and cohesive state. Egypt on the other hand is falling apart before our eyes.

The overthrow of the democratically elected, Muslim Brotherhood led government by the Egyptian military and its co-conspirators in the Egyptian deep state seems to herald the end of the brief Egyptian experiment with democracy. As a result the Muslim Brotherhood’s mode of coming to power by nonviolently, incrementally invading the centers of governance has been discredited. The al Qaeda “idea” of creating an atmosphere of strife and civil disorder as a vehicle for allowing local Islamic groups to come to power through the collapse of the nation-state has gained more credibility. As western democracies tire of the ongoing strife, the resulting “emirates” will be able to throw off the remnants of western hegemony. Al Qaeda can now plausibly say “I told you so”.

The Syrian civil war is likely to result in the breakup of the Syrian state which will spill over into Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. The ethnic Kurds whose nation-state aspirations were ignored by Sykes – Picot will probably reassert themselves in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and possibly Iran. The autocratic Gulf Monarchies of Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia and their partner in Jordan are torn between the need to support their Sunni “takfiri” co-religionists among the Syrian rebels with the possibility of jihadist blowback among their own dissidents and their hatred for Shia Iran. They seem to have decided to double down in Syria while repressing dissent at home.

Whatever the final outcome, it seems certain that the Sykes-Picot construct, which never evolved into a social contract between governments and governed, is doomed to collapse. U.S. policy makers have no good options and little influence. Intervention will likely make a bad situation worse. It won’t be pretty.

Technorati Tags: Middle East,Egypt,Syria

Kicking the Can Again

This week, after six trips to the Middle East and several bouts of shuttle diplomacy, Secretary of State John Kerry announced a new round of Israeli/Palestinian “peace talks”. He stated at the kick off, “I firmly believe that these leaders can make peace.” This was accomplished at great personnel sacrifice as his wife Teresa is seriously ill. My reaction upon hearing this news was “What is he thinking?” What has changed during the last four years of stalemate to make it worthwhile to expend so much personal effort and political capital on a process that has almost no chance of success?

The same regional players are still in place. The Palestinians are still divided between the Fatah led Palestinian Authority (PA) government in Ramallah and the Hamas led government in the Gaza strip. The PA is still run by the same dysfunctional, corrupt, unelected, unrepresentative old men who have been in place since the western powers overthrew the elected Hamas government in 2006. Hamas, which represents 1.4 mm Palestinians in the Gaza strip, is not invited to the party.

On the Israeli side the same Netanyahu led right wing, settler dominated government is still in place. If anything it has become even more right wing since the last elections with the addition of the Jewish Home Party to the governing coalition. JHP’s leader Naftali Bennett was recently quoted as advocating killing suspected militants rather than bringing them to trial; saying “If you catch terrorists, you have to simply kill them” and “I’ve killed lots of Arabs in my life – and there’s no problem with that.” (See here and here)

The Obama administration, in a move seemingly designed to insure failure, appointed former Ambassador to Israel, former AIPAC executive, former Executive Director of the pro-Israel think tank Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk as its Middle East mediator. Indyk makes former mediator Dennis Ross (frequently called “Israel’s lawyer”) look positively unbiased in contrast. In a presentation that I heard by Indyk a few years ago, he couldn’t use the word “Palestinian” without appending the word “terrorist” to it.

The only possible objective that I can see for this declared 9 month negotiation process is to move the process past this year’s United Nations session. The U.S. can claim that the Palestinian State should not join the International Criminal Court (Israel’s worst nightmare) since there is an ongoing American sponsored negotiation process. This would be in line with the strategy (such as it is) of kicking the can down the road and hoping for the best. In general talking is better than shooting. In this case, failed talks may result in shooting.

Technorati Tags: Israel,Palestine,Peace Process,John Kerry

The Hezbollah Conundrum

Last week, the European Union succumbed to U.S./Israel pressure and designated the so called “military wing” of the Lebanese political party/social organization/militia , Hezbollah, as a “terrorist organization”. The decision made by politicians in Brussels has left the EU professional diplomats and legal experts with a major mess to try and sort out. The problems were immediately evident. While an EU spokesperson in Brussels was acclaiming the important consequences of this action, the EU Ambassador to Lebanon, Angeline Eichhorst, was meeting with Hezbollah and other Lebanese leaders in Beirut to explain that this action would have no impact on EU relations with Hezbollah or Lebanon. My reaction was “have they lost it?”

Among the problems that this ill-considered action creates is “who exactly is being blacklisted?” There is no clearly defined line between the “military wing” of Hezbollah and its political and social activities. This was demonstrated during the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah members abandoned their positions as dentists, political figures, farmers etc., reclaimed their AK-47s and grenade launchers from their closets or under their beds and joined the fight against the invader. While there is a professional component to the Hezbollah militia, by and large it is the consummate citizen army.

The U.S. gets around this problem by blacklisting all of Hezbollah. During my last visit to Beirut, I was treated to one of the bizarre consequences of this position when a U.S. diplomat responsible for non-military aid to Lebanon told me that she could not meet with the government minister responsible for disseminating this aid because he was a member of Hezbollah. She had to rely on the Swiss to coordinate with the Lebanese government.

Everyone is puzzled about how the EU will distinguish between the “Civil Wing” and the “Military Wing” of Hezbollah. My friend Franklin Lamb, an American writer and researcher based in Beirut, describes the issues in a recent article.

“According to a lawyer at the American Society of International Law in Washington DC, the EU decision was a big mistake from an international law standpoint and could be an international lawyer’s worst nightmare or a dream come true. Which would depend if the lawyer was representing the EU in trying to unravel the civil-military conundrum or advising thousands of EU member states businesses and agencies wanting to continue any business with the Lebanese government, UNIFIL, or countless NGO’s who regularly interact with Hezbollah. (sic)

‘It’s a real legal mess!’ the ASIL source explained, as he described the legal confusion the EU action caused. ‘The best thing for EU credibility and international relations right now on this subject would be for the EU to forget what it did and to desist from any implementation whatsoever. And then let the designation be removed after the six months trial period as provided by EU regulations. Otherwise, their decision will swamp courtrooms and complicate Middle East-European political and economic relations with challenges from all points on the compass with uncertain outcomes to say the least’.” (The whole article is here.)

(Photos from al Manar)

Technorati Tags: Lebanon,European Union,Hezbollah

Egypt: Can Collapse be Prevented?

 

As Egypt rapidly descends into chaos and as the likelihood of a brutal crackdown by the army on disaffected Islamists increases, the U.S. is struggling to find a path forward which is politically palatable and which supports American interests. American national interest has traditionally been defined as a stable environment that protects Israel, provides low cost energy and allows free access to the Suez Canal. In a 2005 speech at American University in Cairo Secretary of State Condi Rice forcefully articulated a new approach for American policy in the Middle East saying, “The US pursuit of stability in the Middle East at the expense of democracy had achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people." This new approach lasted less than a year. In January 2006 Hamas won a free and fair election in Palestine and the U.S, promptly cut off aid and isolated the Palestinian Authority. Since then, support for democracy has largely taken a back seat to other considerations.

Many have praised the Obama administration’s pragmatic approach to the “Arab Awakening”. The U.S. has supported democracy movements in Tunisia and Egypt and violent revolutions in Libya and Syria, while at the same time supporting brutal suppression of opposition movements in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. There is, however, a fine line between a pragmatic, tactical approach and having no strategy.

The lack of a strategic approach has led to verbal gymnastics by administration spokespersons in order avoid calling the Egyptian Army’s overthrow of the democratically elected government a coup which would trigger a cut off of aid to the government. (See here.) While the Morsi government was certainly guilty of incompetence and a majoritarian approach, fortunately for U.S. democracy, these are not fatal sins justifying a coup. As the old saw goes, “If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck.” The U.S. government has little ability to influence the outcome in Egypt, but its failure to take any position has alienated all sides. Today the Egyptian state media blamed the current unrest on U.S. Ambassador Anne Paterson.

If the U.S. is to have any ability to prevent Egypt from driving over a cliff, it must make clear to the military that it rejects a return to “Mubarakism without Mubarak” and a return to “emergency law” in the name of the “War on Terror”. It must also insist on the release of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, opening of shuttered media outlets and prompt free and fair elections with all parties participating. It must be clear that U.S. military aid depends on their actions.

 

Technorati Tags: Egypt,Muslim Botherhood,Egyptian Coup

Egypt’s Political Collapse

Following the ouster of Egypt’s democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi by the Egyptian Army and the arrest of many Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders and the shuttering of pro-MB media outlets, the Obama administration has struggled to decide how to react to the fast moving events on the ground. Obama’s advisors differ on whether to support the democratically elected government or to back the Egyptian military that has a history of being supportive of U.S. policies in the Middle East. The end result has been a series of bland statements calling for peaceful resolution.

In its effort to formulate a coherent policy, the administration has had no shortage of free advice. New York Times columnist David Brooks wrote an opinion piece (See here) in which he supported the military’s action essentially arguing that a military coup is justified if it overthrows a government that he doesn’t like.
I received an email from an Egyptian friend who supported the military’s action saying:
“Please explain to all your families and friends and deliver to the media that the Egyptian army is protecting the will of the Egyptians to get rid of the Terrorist Muslim Brotherhood, 33 million Egyptians went out in the streets, our army is protecting us Morsy is calling for a civil war, we are asking for an early presidential elections to stop the deterioration of our country and economy. This man and his group are traitors”.
Others have argued that the removal of a democratically elected Islamist government by the military echoes events in Algeria which led to a bloody civil war. (See here and here) The message to political Islam is that you cannot trust democracy. You won’t be allowed to win. The message from the Arab Awakening was that al Qaeda was wrong; an Islamic government can be established through a democratic process. After Egypt, al Qaeda will say, “I told you so.”
I come down on the side that the road to political change in a democracy is through the ballot box and not through confrontation in the street. Sometimes in a democracy, the guy you don’t like wins. Get over it. Change it in the next election. As an Arab friend once said to me, “We can forgive you for electing George W. Bush the first time. Everybody makes mistakes. But the second time, what were you thinking?”
Following today’s massacre of over 40 MB supporters by security forces and the defense of it by Egypt’s so called “liberals”, it is hard to see how this can end happily for Egypt. The choices are stark. Either the military has to cave in and restore Morsi to power (an unlikely event) or the MB has to quietly go away. (Also an unlikely event) Even quick elections that are free, fair and open are unlikely to heal the huge political divisions in Egypt The MB would probably win free and fair elections as the opposition is a fractious coalition of Salafists, liberals, and remnants of the Mubarak regime that is already falling apart and probably would not survive the political process. We are then back to square one. This is a sad time for Egypt and its people.
Photo by Getty Images

Technorati Tags: Egypt,Muslim Brotherhood

Is there a Syrian Strategy?

Last week, after much debate and hand ringing, the Obama administration announced that the U.S. would begin to directly arm the Syrian rebel forces. The announcement was made in such a manner that it obscured more that clarified U.S. policy with respect to this bloody two year conflict. It remains vague what sort of weapons will be supplied, who will receive them, how they will be supplied and what is the expected outcome of this step. It appears that the announcement is mostly a political move by the administration to counter the barrage of criticism that it has received from friend and foe for failing to be more aggressive in supporting the rebels. The announcement focused exclusively on tactics and did nothing to clarify U.S. strategy.

The Assad regime and its supporters, however, appear to have a clear strategy. It is evident that Hezbollah and Iran see the collapse of the Assad government and its replacement by an unfriendly government dominated by radical Sunni fundamentalists as an existential threat. Iran relies on Hezbollah to provide a deterrent force to prevent an Israeli attack and Hezbollah relies on a continuing flow of arms from Iran through Syria to enable them to prevent an Israeli attack on Lebanon. They, therefore, appear committed to doing everything possible to prevent the fall of Assad. Iran is providing arms and advisors and Hezbollah is providing leadership and well trained and effective urban fighters. Their strategy is to recapture critical roads, junctions and population centers in order to prevent the flow of arms and fighters to the rebel armies. In this they have been quite successful.

In the face of this progress by the Assad forces, it unclear how the U.S. arms policy can have much effect. The fundamentalist Gulf monarchies, led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have been supplying arms and fighters for months with little to show for it. Assad and his allies have succeeded in cutting supply routes from Jordan and Lebanon. The only remaining route is through Turkey and Turkey is facing own political upheaval and the AKP government’s support for the rebels is increasing unpopular as the fighting spills over into Turkish territory. The rebel’s efforts have been reduced to conducting terrorist attacks in Syrian cities.

If this modest step by Obama has little or no effect, the pressure will increase to “do more”. If the strategy is to overthrow Assad, success will require increasing military intervention, which will risk entering a quagmire or a potential confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah and possibly Russia. If the strategy is to bleed Iran and Hezbollah until they are too weak to resist the U.S./Israel, we need to be prepared for more stories of bloodshed and refugees over a long period of time. If we are looking for a negotiated settlement, we will need to include Iran in the negotiations and be prepared for a settlement that leaves a government acceptable to Iran in power. Whatever the strategy, the American people deserve to know what it is and the consequences of that choice.

Photo by ibtimes.co.uk

Technorati Tags: Syria Civil War,U.S. Foreign Policy,Middle East

Iran’s Election is a Contest

 

Most western pundits portray Iranian elections as a sham orchestrated by the Supreme leader to reach a desired outcome. (See here and here) I, however, find the rough and tumble political contests among Iran’s many factions to be fascinating. Tomorrow’s first round of the Iranian Presidential election is shaping up to be an interesting race; perhaps more interesting than the usual U.S. election which generally boils down to two candidates, selected by the big money donors, who are undifferentiated with respect to their foreign policy.

The most recent polling data that I have seen shows the following:

Prediction of voter turnout:                     71%.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf                  23%

Mohsen Rezaei                                         14%

Hassan Rowhani                                       13%

Saeed Jalili                                                10%

Ali Akbar Velayati                                       8%

Mohammad Reza Aref                               6%

Mohammad Gharazi                                  2%

Gholam Ali Haddad Adel                            2%

Hassan Rowhani, the only cleric in the group, and Mohammad Aref represent the more moderate wing of Iranian politics. Since this polling, Aref has dropped out of the contest in order avoid splitting the “moderate vote”. This change, combined with the endorsement of Rowhani by former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani seems to have given the secular liberal population a new dose of enthusiasm. With the remaining candidates splitting the “conservative” vote, it is plausible that Mohammad Ghalibaf and Rowhani could end up in the June 21 runoff election.

Ghalibaf, the pragmatic Mayor of Tehran, is a strong and popular candidate. For a large metropolitan area Tehran is a livable city, if you can get by the life threatening experience of Tehran traffic. Tehranis tend to love their mayors. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a former Tehran mayor. While the projected turnout may be overstated, it is certain to be greater than the U.S. 58%.

Whatever the outcome, any change in Iran’s foreign policy is unlikely. A large majority of Iranians support the nuclear program and changing position on this is in the hands of the Supreme Leader and politically is a non-starter. If the outcome results in better management of the Iranian economy it will make a difference for the ordinary Iranian and that’s what counts for them.

(Another commentary on Iran’s election is here)

Technorati Tags: Iran Election