Engaging Iran II

During her recent diplomatic tour of Europe and the Middle East, Secretary of State Clinton indicated that Iran would be invited to the upcoming security conference on Afghanistan. This is a positive development as both the US and Iran would like to see a stable Afghanistan which is not governed by the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban and the US and Iran can probably reach some accommodation on dealing with Afghanistan.
Other issues between the US and Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hezbollah will, however, be much more difficult to deal with. When I returned from Iran two years ago people asked me “What do you think about Iran’s nuclear ambitions?” My answer was “I have no idea whether or not Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, but I can understand why they might want them”.
Iran is surrounded by Sunni ruled countries who have been encouraged by the US to be hostile toward Iran and the so-called “Shia crescent”. Iran’s two major adversaries, US and Israel, are nuclear armed and have threatened regime change and a military attack on the Islamic Republic.
Up until now Iran’s strategic defense strategy has been asymmetric. Rather than relying on their conventional forces, Iran has armed and aided Hamas and Hezbollah in order to threaten Israel should either the US or Israel attack. It has also encouraged and supported Muslim Brotherhood related Islamist opposition groups in Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan who are allied with the US. A nuclear capability would give Iran a deterrent defense capability that did not rely on Hezbollah and Hamas or political unrest in the Arab world.
If the US is to be able to convince Iran to change its strategic calculations, there will need to be a major change in American policies toward Iran. Iran will need to be persuaded that the US no longer desires regime change and has taken the military option off the table. They will also expect that the US will demonstrate that it is able to control Israel. (This is a difficult task given likelihood of an Israeli government led by Bibi Netanyahu.)
In view of the large population of neo-liberals and AIPAC supporters of Likud’s hard-line Israeli policies within the Obama administration, it is unlikely that such a major policy shift can occur. So far the US talk has continued to be about “carrots and sticks” to which the Iranian response has been “carrots and sticks are for donkeys”. We will, therefore, likely see a continuation of the adversarial stalemate brought about by the policies of the last 30 years with its adverse implications for stability in the region.