In the middle of the last decade, during the dark days of internecine violence in Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion, there was a vociferous political argument as to whether or not there was civil war in Iraq. As with most political debates in the U.S. the discussion was generally devoid of facts and intellectual rigor. No one bothered to define exactly what constitutes a civil war. Scholars generally describe a civil war as a violent conflict within the recognized borders of a state whose participants are geographically contiguous and concerned with having to live with one another after the conflict. Both sides must have formally organized armed forces and must control some amount of territory. The purpose of this definition is to differentiate civil war from other domestic violence such as riots and guerilla insurgencies.
By this definition the yearlong Syrian uprising seems to be morphing into a civil war. The members of the so called “Friends of Syria” (FOS) group led by the U.S. and its allies has recognized the Syrian National Council (SNC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian opposition and promised to provide support to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The conservative Sunni Gulf State monarchies, led by Qatar, have gone further by declaring their intent to support the Syrian opposition against the Shia Assad regime “by all means”, including supplying weapons and paying the FSA. Ironically, this has put the FOS on the same side as al Qaeda who has declared its support for the Syrian uprising. (See here) The al Qaeda support has resulted in an increase in the flow if experienced jihadist fighters from Lebanon, Iraq and Libya into the FSA.
One characteristic of civil wars is, once they begin, they are notoriously difficult to end. Ending an interstate war is hard enough, but in that case, one side will eventually return to its own territory and the war will end. In civil wars, where partition is not possible (as in the case of Syria), the two sides who have been killing each other must either live side by side and work together peacefully in a common government or one side must be victorious and get all. In order for the war to end both sides must be simultaneously pessimistic about the possibility of improving their situation by continuing fighting. The prospect of outside intervention only increases the likelihood the one side or the other will conclude that if it only fights on a little longer, its position will improve. In an internal conflict, stalemate is an acceptable alternative to losing.
As the outside forces, FOS on one side and Russia, China and Iran on the other, escalate their support for their preferred party, the prospect for Syria is years of violence, bloodshed and instability. The duration of post WW II civil wars is usually measured in decades and the wars usually do not end, but merely become frozen conflicts or guerilla insurgencies.
